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the conclusion of the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
in 1993 and for Korea since the initiation of the FTA drive in 2003.
Both governments have promoted the U.S.-Korea FTA as the trade
agreement that will enhance trade between the two countries and
promote economic prosperity. The article critically reviews the
inherent features of the U.S.-Korea FTA and examines whether the
FTA is expected to promote the promised economic prosperity for
both countries. The article also discusses prospects and impacts of
the FTA on creating even larger free trade agreements between East
Asia and North America and between East Asia and Europe.
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INTRODUCTION

The historic U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA),1 which is
the largest FTA since the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) and the first FTA between major trading nations in North
America and Asia, was agreed upon on April 2, 2007 after 14 months of
negotiations, and signed on June 30, 2007.2 Nonetheless, legislatures of the
two countries have not been able to ratify the FTA after well over three
years, although they might be a bit closer to ratification due to the
renegotiation of the FTA on December 5, 2010.3 Considering the fact that
the governments of the two countries were able to sign the controversial
FTA after negotiations that continued for only 14 months, this failure to
ratify the agreement for such a long time is an ironic aftermath.
The U.S.-Korea FTA faced significant political opposition in the
two countries: on December 18, 2008, Korean media reported that violence
erupted in the National Assembly of Korea (i.e., the Korean legislature)
during a deliberation of the Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee at which the
ruling party attempted to table a motion to pass the U.S.-Korea FTA, a
prerequisite procedure for the vote of ratification at the plenary session
under the Korean constitution. Meanwhile, the opposition party members
of the Sub-Committee were blocked from entering the meeting room.4

1

Free Trade Agreement between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America,
U.S.-S. Kor., June 30, 2007, modified, Dec. 5, 2010 [hereinafter KORUS FTA], available at
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta/final-text. A full text
version is available from the Republic of Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
[hereinafter MOFAT], at http://www.fta.go.kr/pds/fta_korea/usa/eng/2E_all.pdf. For
additional details regarding the U.S.-Korea FTA, see Signed, Negotiated and Concluded
FTAs, http://www.fta.go.kr/new/ftakorea/kor_usa.asp?country_idx=19 (last visited Oct. 28,
2010) (in Korean).
2
For the chronology of the U.S.-Korea FTA negotiations and signing provided by MOFAT,
see Korea — U.S. FTA, at http://www.mofat.go.kr/english/econtrade/fta/Concluded/US/
index.jsp (last visited Oct. 28, 2010) [hereinafter MOFAT, Chronology]. Particularly, the
final completion of the negotiations and the subsequent signing of the agreement between
the trade ministers of the two countries are detailed in MOFAT’s press releases. Press
Release, MOFAT, Han-Mi FTA Choijong Hyupjungmoon Gonggae [Final Text of the
Korea-U.S. FTA Made Publicly Available] (No. 07-428, July 2, 2007), available at
http://www.mofat.go.kr/press/pressinformation/index.jsp (enter “FTA” in search box and
look for press release item no. 259, posted on July 2, 2007); Press Release, MOFAT, HanMi Jayu Muyuk Hyupjung (FTA) Hyupsang Tagyul [Korea-U.S FTA Negotiations
Completed] (No. 07-191, Apr. 2, 2007), available at http://www.mofat.go.kr/press/
pressinformation/index.jsp (enter “FTA” in search box and look for press release item no.
239, posted on April 4, 2007) (last visited Oct. 28, 2010).
3
U.S., Korea Sign Sweeping Free-Trade Agreement, TAIPEI TIMES, Dec. 5, 2010,
http://www.taipeitimes.com/news/front/archives/2010/12/05/02003490144.
4
For an account of the resistance of opposition Democratic Party members to tabling the
agreement and their attempt to force an entry into the National Assembly after being barred

114

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6

Representatives of NGOs, together with academics and former high-level
government officials in Korea all expressed concerns about the unfairness
of the terms of the FTA and possible adverse long-term effects on Korea’s
economy and society, some of which are elaborated upon in this article.
The prospect did not appear very promising in the United States,
either. While the Republican administration welcomed the negotiated FTA
at the time of its completion, the then Democratic majority leaders in
Congress raised objections to its ratification.5 Hillary Clinton, the U.S.
Secretary of State of the current administration, indicated that the renegotiation of some of the terms of the U.S.-Korea FTA would be
necessary before Congress could ratify it.6 Even though the United States

from attendance by Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Park Jin, a member of the
incumbent Grand National Party, see Hyun-Kyung Kang, Assembly in FTA Conflict, KOR.
TIMES, Dec. 18, 2008, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2008/12/116_36329.
html.
5
For instance, Sander Levin from the State of Michigan, chair of the House Subcommittee
on Trade, stated that the agreement failed to “assure elimination of the barriers against US
automotive products and the opening of Korea's iron curtain around their market” and
promised to oppose the deal unless changes were made to rectify this during the 90-day
Congressional review period. US and Korea Conclude Free Trade Agreement, BRIDGES
WEEKLY TRADE NEWS DIGEST, Apr. 4, 2007, http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/7581.
Other prominent Democratic Senators—including then-campaigning presidential candidates
Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama—were also known to oppose the U.S.-Korea FTA. See
Hilori ‘Han-Mi FTA Bijun Bandae’ [Hillary ‘Opposes Ratification of Korea-U.S. FTA’],
DONG-A NEWS, June 11, 2007, http://www.donga.com/fbin/output?n=200706110083
(reporting presidential candidate Hillary Clinton’s remarks at a meeting with the AFL-CIO
that disparaged the Korea-U.S. FTA on grounds that it did not favor US auto exports and
was disadvantageous to the US’s current trade deficit, and predicted that other democratic
candidates would be motivated to take similar positions so as to secure labor union support);
see also reports of one commentator, noting that the U.S. Congress had not ratified a bill to
extend normal trade relations with Vietnam, and that it was expected future trade bills
would face greater difficulty in passing through the Democratic Congress. Steven
Weisman, Trade Bills Now Face Tough Odds, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2006, at C1
[hereinafter Weisman, Trade Bills].
6
See Michael Ha, Clinton Indicates Renegotiation of KORUS FTA, KOR. TIMES, Jan. 14,
2009, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2009/01/116_37853.html (quoting
Hillary Clinton during the Democratic administration’s transition period as arguing that the
“[FTA] provisions need[] to be renegotiated to ensure fair bilateral trade practices in the
future . . . . [and adding] that Obama hasn’t changed his position on the FTA [negotiated and
signed by the outgoing Bush administration] and continues to oppose the deal in its current
form.”). Two months after the completion of the FTA negotiations in April 2007, and at the
request of the United States, the two countries conducted additional negotiations on labor
and environmental issues, signing a final text on June 30, 2007. WILLIAM H. COOPER ET. AL.,
U.S. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE PROPOSED U.S.-SOUTH KOREA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
(KORUS FTA): PROVISIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 39 (2010) (describing in note 148 how the
two sides held further negotiations and included new language in the final text signed on
June 30, 2007, incorporating “internationally-accepted” labor rights and certain
environmental principles), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/
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made important achievements in the negotiations, fulfilling key American
interests in the areas of agriculture, pharmaceuticals, intellectual property
rights (IPRs), and services, some leaders in Congress doubted as to whether
American automobiles would gain long-awaited market access in Korea as
a result of the FTA and expressed concern that the FTA would further
increase Korean exports to America at the expense of U.S. domestic
automobile producers.7 A report circulated by the U.S. Senate Committee
on Finance indicated that four major issues would have to be addressed
before the U.S.-Korea FTA could be consented to, namely: the large
imbalance in the automobile trade between the United States and Korea;
problems involving U.S. beef exports to Korea; the opening up of the
Korean rice market; and the treatment of Korea’s outer production zone in
North Korea, called the “Kaesong Industrial Complex.”8

127268.pdf [hereinafter COOPER, PROVISIONS AND IMPLICATIONS]. For a brief outline of the
“new trade policy” principles articulated by the U.S. Congress, see infra note 54. After the
June 2007 signing date, the Korean government established its opposition to any proposed
re-negotiation of certain provisions, arguing that such re-negotiation would undermine the
balance of concessions between the two countries achieved through the original
negotiations, although it had implied a possibility of “additional negotiations” that would
address remaining concerns of the parties without involving any change of terms in the
previously-agreed FTA provisions. In early November 2010, the two sides conducted
“additional negotiations” in Seoul mostly with respect to the automobile sector, though it
initially appeared as though they would remain mired in contention. Obama to return home
empty-handed: U.S., South Korea Fail to Reach Agreement on Free-Trade Deal,
NYDAILYNEWS.COM, Nov. 11, 2010, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/2010/
11/11/2010-11-11_us_south_korea_fail_to_reach_agreement_on_freetrade_deal.html; see
also He-Suk Choi, Korea, U.S., to Meet to Settle FTA Disputes, KOR. HERALD, Nov. 5, 2010,
http://www.koreaherald.com/national/Detail.jsp?newsMLId=20101105000555 (explaining
how the two nations were conducting additional meetings to iron out areas of disagreement
in the run-up to G20 Seoul Summit); President Obama and President Lee, Joint Press
Conference on G-20 (Nov. 11, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2010/11/11/president-conference-with-president-obama-and-president-lee-republickor (quoting President Lee as announcing to the press that he had agreed with President
Obama on the need for further talks between the Trade Minister and U.S. Trade
Representative, and President Obama emphasizing the priority the U.S. placed on removing
barriers, while articulating the ways in which the FTA would “create jobs and prosperity in
both our countries” and constitute a “win-win for both countries.”). However, on
December 5, 2010 the two sides finally reached a final agreement and concluded
renegotiation of the FTA. See U.S., Korea Sign Sweeping Free-Trade Agreement, supra
note 3.
7
Congressional leaders’ attitudes towards such deals were little changed from months
earlier, when the Vietnam deal provoked stormy opposition. Weisman, Trade Bills, supra
note 5, at C1, C5.
8
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., 111TH CONG., TRADE ISSUES IN THE 111TH CONGRESS (2009).
See also U.S. Senate Points Out 4 Potential Points of Discussion Regarding FTA,
ARIRANG.CO.KR, Jan. 14, 2009, http://www.arirang.co.kr/News/News_View.asp?nseq=
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Despite the continuing controversies in Korea, 9 and the air of
discomfort and hesitation surrounding the ratification of the U.S.-Korea
FTA by the U.S. Congress, the legislatures of both countries are expected
to eventually ratify the FTA because of the closely interconnected political
and economic interests of the two countries.10 The two countries may
consider that if the proposed U.S.-Korea FTA fails to go into effect, the
repercussions will be felt not only in the economic sector, but also in the
political and diplomatic sectors.11 Such interconnectedness has developed
over several decades: the United States and Korea have maintained a strong
military alliance and close economic relations for over six decades. In
2008, trade between the United States and Korea amounted to US$84.74
billion, making the United States Korea’s third-largest trading partner and
Korea the United States’ seventh-largest trading partner. 12 This FTA

86330&code=Ne4 (describing the Senate Finance Committee’s position on the four major
changes that the FTA would have to include, while forecasting “a rough road ahead for the
already signed and sealed free trade agreement . . . .”).
9
See Jaemin Lee, Korea-U.S. Economic Relationship With or Without an FTA: KORUS
FTA as a Better Alternative to Manage the Bilateral Economic Relationship, 2009 JOINT
U.S.-KOREA ACADEMIC STUDIES 159 [hereinafter LEE, BETTER ALTERNATIVE], available at
http://www.keia.org/Publications/JointAcademicStudies/2009/Jaemin.pdf (“Korea has
concluded roughly about 2,500 treaties since its inception in 1948, but probably none of
them have caused such a heated controversy and debate as we are observing with respect to
[the Korea-U.S. FTA].”). There are currently 227 treaties in force between the two countries,
none of which has invited a similar level of ongoing national controversy. For a summary
from MOFAT of treaties the Republic of Korea has signed to date, see Daehan Mingug
Yangja Joyag Jeongbo: Balhyo Joyag [Republic of Korea Bilateral Treaty Information:
Treaties in Force], http://www.mofat.go.kr/state/treatylaw/treatyinformation/
index.jsp (listing bilateral treaties to which Korea is a signatory in reverse chronological
order).
10
In a recent interview, President Barack Obama pledged to push for ratification of the
U.S.-Korea FTA. Mike Dorning & Julianna Goldman, Obama Says He’s ‘Fierce’ FreeMarket Advocate, Rejects Critics, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Feb. 11, 2010, available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aDLk0lPYaSa0 (“[President
Obama] said he would press for passage this year of free-trade agreements with South
Korea, Panama and Columbia, though he cautioned that ‘different glitches’ must first be
negotiated with each country.”). Once ratified, the agreement goes into effect 60 days after
the exchange of instruments notifying the other side of completion of respective domestic
procedures. See KORUS FTA, supra note 1, art. 24.5, available at http://www.ustr.gov/
sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/korus/asset_upload_file12_12723.pdf.
(“This
Agreement shall enter into force 60 days after the date the Parties exchange written
notifications certifying that they have completed their respective applicable legal
requirements and procedures or on such other date as the Parties may agree.”).
11
See LEE, BETTER ALTERNATIVE, supra note 9, at 166 (“If the proposed KORUS FTA fails
to go into effect, the impact will not be simply confined to the obvious economic loss.
Needless to say, political and diplomatic repercussions will certainly follow. . . .”).
12
See generally
MOFAT, KOREA-U.S. TRADE SUMMARY (Dec.
2009),
http://www.mofat.go.kr/english/econtrade/bilateral/issues/index2.jsp?TabMenu=TabMenu2
(listing export, import, trade volume and trade balance values from 2006 to September
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between the two countries stands to be the most significant trade agreement
for the United States since NAFTA in terms of its economic and trade
impact.13 Due to the broad political and economic effects it will have on
both countries, as well as on the trade and economy in Asia and beyond,
the proposed U.S.-Korea FTA has become a subject of much interest and
considerable debate. This article provides a discussion of the background
of the U.S.-Korea FTA, the key issues involved, and its broader impact on
the trade relations in the Asian-Pacific region and beyond.
II.

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE U.S. -KOREA FTA
A. Economic Background

The FTA talks between the United States and Korea began in
November 2004 when the two countries agreed, at a Trade Ministers’
meeting held in Chile, to hold preliminary working-level talks to examine
the feasibility of an FTA between the two countries.14 The driving forces
behind the U.S.-Korea FTA can be analyzed from many different angles.
First, from the U.S. economic perspective, Korea provides a major export
market, and the United States wants to increase access to products and
services markets in which it has a competitive advantage, such as in
agricultural and pharmaceutical goods, as well as the financial services
market. Because Korea, in Washington’s view, has a low level of openness
in these markets, the United States can expect the FTA to yield large
increases in exports.15 For this reason, the Office of the United States
2010). However, it should be noted that if the “Chinese Diversion” effect—encompassing
Korean products made in China but destined for the U.S. market, which are not accounted
for in the Korean statistics—is duly accounted for, the United States may still be the largest
trading partner of Korea. See, e.g., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN
GOODS AND SERVICES, EXHIBIT 14: EXPORTS, IMPORTS AND BALANCE OF GOODS BY
SELECTED COUNTRIES AND GEOGRAPHIC AREAS (Feb. 11, 2009), available at http://www.
census.gov/foreign-trade/Press-Release/2008pr/12/exh14.txt (reflecting cumulative 2008
U.S. imports from China and Korea, amounting to US$337.79 billion worth of imports from
China, compared to US$48.08 billion worth of imports from Korea in the same period).
13
See U.S. Senate Points Out 4 Potential Points of Discussion Regarding FTA,
ARIRANG.CO.KR supra note 8.
14
MOFAT, Chronology, supra note 2.
15
According to the U.S. International Trade Commission’s Report to Congress, Korea’s
exports to the United States are expected to increase by 21% under the U.S.-Korea FTA,
whereas Korea’s imports of U.S. agricultural products will increase by more than 200% in
four years. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N (“USITC”), USITC PUB. 3452, U.S.-KOREA FTA:
THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ESTABLISHING A FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (“FTA”) BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA (Inv. No. 332-425, 2001) [hereinafter USITC,
Impact], available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/docs/pubs/332/pub3452.pdf. U.S.
exports to Korea of manufactured products including movie films will increase by more
than 54%, resulting in significant market expansion for major U.S. exports. Id. at 5-1.
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Trade Representative (USTR) has emphasized the economic importance of
the FTA with Korea, in contrast to other post-NAFTA U.S. FTAs, which
had been more politically motivated.16 In addition, the United States can
seek to benefit U.S. businesses by adopting a comprehensive FTA that
requires Korean laws and practices to conform to U.S. standards in areas
where U.S. trade interests are affected. 17 Furthermore, the successful
conclusion of the U.S.-Korea FTA may also prompt Japan, which provides
an even larger market for U.S. exports, to consider its own FTA with the
United States more seriously in order to avoid being excluded from the U.S.
driven free trade area in Asia.18
In turn, the Korean government expects the FTA with the United
States to provide its “middle-aged” economy with new growth momentum
by expanding trade with the United States and improving its less productive
service industries.19 The FTA is also expected to induce competition in
their respective markets between Korean service industries and their
competitive U.S. counterparts operating on a global scale. Proponents of

16

In light of the economic importance of the FTA, the former head of the USTR Rob
Portman stated that the U.S.-Korea FTA “is the most commercially significant free trade
negotiation [since NAFTA].” Press Release, Off. of the U.S. Trade Rep. (USTR), United
States, Korea Announce Intention to Negotiate Free Trade Agreement (Feb. 2, 2006)
[hereinafter Portman Press Release], http://ustraderep.gov/Document_Library/Press_
Releases/2006/February/United_States,_South_Korea_Announce_Intention_to_Negotiate_F
ree_Trade_Agreement.html.
17
Further discussion on this point, as well as a treatment of the characteristics and problems
of a comprehensive FTA, are provided in the next section.
18
The possibility of an FTA between the United States and Japan has long been discussed,
but Japan’s unwillingness to open its agricultural market has always been an obstacle to the
promotion of an FTA between the two countries. In an annual U.S.–Japan business meeting
held in Tokyo, the U.S. ambassador to Japan, Thomas Schieffer, said that agriculture must
be included in any talks if the United States and Japan are to discuss a free trade agreement,
and that Washington would not be prepared to talk about one so long as Japan treats its
agriculture sector “in a different way.” See Ambassador Thomas Schieffer, Address Before
U.S.–Japan Business Council at the Imperial Hotel (Nov. 13, 2006) (“The second tenet that
is important to remember is that agriculture has to be a part of any negotiation, whether you
call that a free trade agreement or an economic partnership agreement. . . . Comprehensive
in the American context means agriculture has to be included.”), available at
http://tokyo.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-20061113-74.html; see also EMMA CHANLETT-AVERY ET
AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33436, JAPAN-U.S. RELATIONS: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, at 14
(2011), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33436.pdf [hereinafter CHANLETTAVERY, ISSUES].
19
The Korean economy had been one of the most rapidly growing economies since the
1960s until the 1997 financial crisis. It recovered from the crisis, but its economic
performance became sluggish, showing only 0.7 percent real growth in gross national
income in 2005, with some improvement of 2.6 and 3.9 percent in 2006 and 2007,
respectively. See generally BANK OF KOR., ECONOMIC STATISTICS SYSTEM (ECOS),
http://ecos.bok.or.kr/jsp/use/economyinfo_e/EconomyInfoCtl.jsp?actionType=&searchGubu
n=4&lm=5&nowNo=1.
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the U.S.-Korea FTA argue that by inducing this competition, the agreement
will enhance the quality and competitiveness of Korean service industries,
thereby simultaneously improving consumer welfare and creating more
service-related jobs.20 This supposedly positive effect of the U.S.-Korea
FTA on the Korean economy has been subjected to intense debate. The
following section provides a discussion on this point.
B. Political Background
Although the economic aspects of the U.S.-Korea FTA have been
emphasized by the governments of both countries, there is also a subtle, but
significant political dimension to the agreement. China, Korea’s largest
export market, 21 had approached Korea with an interest in beginning
government-level talks for a free trade agreement,22 which would further
strengthen the rapidly growing economic ties between China and Korea.
Amid the growing Sino-American tension,23 the U.S.-Korea FTA is in line
with the strategic needs of the United States to hold China in check and to
strengthen its political and economic alliance with the other East Asian
countries.24 From the Korean government’s point of view, establishing
closer economic relations with the United States through an FTA will also
help solidify Korea’s security cooperation relationship with its most

20

Hyun-Chong Kim, Significance of the Korea-U.S. FTA from Korea’s Perspective (Mar. 8,
2006), available at http://www.fta.go.kr/user/intro/Media_view.asp?idx=953&currentPage=
20&currentBlock=2&search=title&keyword=.
21
See supra note 12.
22
Soh-Jung Yoo, China Expresses Interest in FTA with Korea, KOR. HERALD, Aug. 4, 2005,
available at http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=108&oid=
044&aid=0000052410 [hereinafter Yoo, China]. During a meeting with Korean Prime
Minister Lee Hae-Chan in Beijing, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao expressed strong hopes for
the early launch of FTA negotiations with Korea; see also Jin-Woo Lee, ‘Tonghwa Suwap
Gomapji? FTA Haja.’ Joong-Il Jungsang Ittara Yogu [‘Aren’t You Thankful for the
Monetary Swap? Let’s Sign an FTA.’ China and Japan Are Calling for FTAs], E-DAILY,
Dec. 13, 2008, http://www.edaily.co.kr/news/NewsRead.edy?SCD=DA31&newsid=
01207046586638192&DCD=A01502&OutLnkChk=Y (reporting announcements by
Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, during the December
2008 Korea-Japan and Korea-China summit meetings, declaring their interest in initiating
FTA negotiations with Korea) [hereinafter Lee, China and Japan].
23
See Jaemin Lee, Torn between the Two Trade Giants: U.S.-China Trade Disputes and
Korea, 5 KEI ACADEMIC PAPER SERIES 5 (June 2010), available at
http://www.keia.org/Publications/AcademicPaperSeries/2010/APS-JaeminLee.pdf
(discussing Sino-American tensions and their effects on Korea).
24
It has been reported that the United States was suspected of exerting influence over
Korea’s decision to pursue an FTA with the U.S. before China. See Yong-Ma Lee, FTA,
Joonggug Daeshin Migug [FTA: United States instead of China], MBC NEWS, Aug. 10,
2006, available at http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=115&
oid=214&aid=0000013951.
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important ally.25 In the years preceding the FTA negotiations, some key
security issues, including policies on North Korea, were the subject of
disagreement between Washington and Seoul. This discord raised
significant concerns and it was hoped that the new FTA with the United
States would help patch up the differences and mollify anxiety over the
perceived gaps in U.S.-Korea relations.26
C. FTA Negotiations
Once the negotiations were initiated, both governments strived for
a speedy conclusion of the negotiations. At the commencement declaration,
the then head of the USTR, Rob Portman, optimistically stated that the
negotiations would be completed by the end of 2006, and the Korean Trade
Minister Hyun-Jong Kim also stated that the U.S.-Bahrain FTA — signed
after only two rounds of negotiations — provided an ideal model for the
U.S.-Korea FTA negotiations.27 Reflecting on this declaration, the U.S.Korea FTA negotiations were initially scheduled to take place only through
to the end of the year, but were then extended until March of the following
year.28 Even though an agreement was finally reached between the two
countries after rounds of treacherous negotiations, controversies still
remain.29 Concern about various provisions of the FTA, particularly in

25

Jae-Joon Heo, Han-Mi FTA, Nodong Shijang, Nosa Gwangae [U.S.-Korea FTA, Labor
Market, Labor-Management Relationship] (Kor. Lab. Inst., Seoul, S. Kor.), Apr. 23, 2006,
cited in Cho Sang-Gi, Iljari Jungga Tumuniupko, Dwaerae 'Gujojojong' Wooryu [What
Does Korea-U.S. FTA Mean to Laborers: Increase in Jobs is Ridiculous, In Fact Concerns
About Restructuring, LABOR TODAY, Mar. 28, 2007, http://www.labortoday.co.kr/photo/
view.asp?arId=70273&pNo=46&mId1=09&mId2=04&sDate=&isView=l.
26
Won-Hyuk Lim, Visiting Researcher at the Brookings Institute, Washington D.C., held
the view that the proposed U.S.-Korea FTA was not the proper way to solve this problem in
the U.S.-Korea relations. See Won-Hyuk Lim, Roh Moo-Hyun Daetongryungee Nixon
Daetongryung Dalmattago? [Does the Korean President Roh Moo-Hyun Resemble Nixon?],
PRESSIAN NEWS, Aug. 30, 2006, www.pressian.com/scripts/section/article.asp?article_num=
40060830164422&s_menu=%BC%BC%B0%E8.
27
Portman Press Release, supra note 16.
28
See supra note 2.
29
The FTA negotiations between the United States and Korea proceeded expeditiously.
When compared to the Korea-Japan FTA, which is in a state of deadlock after many years
of discussions, extensive research work, and six rounds of negotiations, the U.S.-Korea FTA
was not prepared nearly as well. One of this article’s authors warned in a previous article
that if the U.S.-Korea FTA negotiations were to continue at the proposed fast pace without
domestic consensus, many problems could arise. See Yong-Shik Lee, Korea – USA Free
Trade Agreement: Issues and Outlook, 15 KOR. FORUM ON INT’L TRADE & BUS. LAW 215
(2006) [hereinafter Lee, Issues and Outlook]. These problems have indeed occurred,
including a widespread civil alliance against the U.S.-Korea FTA and strong opposition
manifested in nationwide rallies in Korea.
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Korea, still remains.30 Intense demonstrations in opposition to the FTA
swept through a number of cities in Korea during the negotiations.31 The
situation in the United States did not appear so promising either, in view of
the consistent demand by the Senate’s Democratic majority for more
concessions from Korea before it would consent to the FTA.32
III.

RECENT TRENDS IN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE U.S.KOREA FTA
A. General Development

As of December 2008, over 200 regional trade agreements (RTAs)
were in effect,33 and more than 60% of world trade volume was attributed
to trades under RTAs. 34 This indicates that along with the WTO’s
multilateral trading system, the regional trading system based on numerous
bilateral and multilateral FTAs35 constitutes an integral part of the world
trading system today. The number of RTAs has been rapidly increasing
since the establishment of the WTO.36 The reason for this increase can be
traced into the growing difficulties for countries to reach agreements in the
multilateral trading system of the WTO, which is comprised of as many as
153 countries. 37 The WTO member countries have shown significant
differences in their interests and views, resulting in a deadlock in
negotiation talks. Effective resolutions of these different interests through
the WTO remain very difficult, if not entirely impossible. The stalled

30

By November 2006, as many as 300 NGOs and labor unions in Korea had formed a civil
alliance against the U.S.-Korea FTA. Korea Sees Worst Labor Protests in Years, CHOSUN
ILBO, Nov. 23, 2006 [hereinafter Labor Protests], http://english.chosun.com/site/data/
html_dir/2006/11/23/2006112361009.html.
31
On November 22, 2006, over 72,000 demonstrators in 13 cities rallied against the FTA.
See id.
32
See supra note 5.
33
See WORLD TRADE ORG., REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS NOTIFIED TO THE GATT/WTO
AND IN FORCE (Dec. 15, 2008), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/eif_e.xls
[hereinafter WTO RTAs] (listing all GATT/WTO treaties currently in force as of the stated
date). To access more comprehensive information about every aspect of RTAs, see
generally http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm.
34
Mitsuo Matsushita, Legal Aspects of Free Trade Agreements: in the Context of Article
XXIV of the GATT 1994, in WTO AND EAST ASIA: NEW PERSPECTIVES 497 (Mitsuo
Matsushita & Dukgeun Ahn eds., 2004).
35
The number of RTAs was only 27 during the 1970s and the 1980s but increased to 64 in
the 1990s and over 100 after 2000, rapidly increasing since the establishment of the WTO.
See generally WTO RTAs, supra note 33.
36
Id.
37
See WORLD TRADE ORG., Members and Observers (July 23, 2008), http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm.
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negotiations of the Doha Development Agenda evidence this difficulty.38
Accordingly, the current trend of entering into an FTA with other countries
in the same region or with countries that share similar interests and views is
expected to intensify.39
Following this trend, both the United States and Korea, which had
not been actively engaged in bilateral or multilateral regional trading
arrangements until the 1990s,40 began to increase efforts to conclude FTAs.
Korea started with an FTA with Chile in 200441 and then entered into FTAs
with Singapore, 42 the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), 43 the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 44 and India, 45 all of
which are currently in effect. Korea then completed negotiations FTAs
with the United States and the European Union. 46 Korea is currently

38

The DDA negotiations have just passed their ninth anniversary. See World Trade
Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41
I.L.M. 746 (2002). The negotiations are currently bogged down in the swamp of competing
national interests of 153 members of the WTO in the absence of a long-waited breakthrough.
39
See Yong-Shik Lee, Foreign Direct Investment and Regional Trade Liberalization: A
Viable Answer for Economic Development?, 39 J. WORLD TRADE 701, 702 (2005)
[hereinafter Lee, FDI]; see also YONG-SHIK LEE, RECLAIMING DEVELOPMENT IN THE WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM 141 (2006) [hereinafter LEE, RECLAIMING] (observing that RTAs “have
significant effects on international trade because about 90 percent of WTO members,
including a number of developing country Members, have signed at least one or more
RTAs.”).
40
The United States made only two FTAs until the 1990s: the NAFTA agreement and a
bilateral FTA with Israel, the latter primarily for political purposes.
41
Free Trade Agreement between the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Chile, Chile-S.
Kor., Feb. 15, 2003 (entered into force Apr. 1, 2004), available at http://www.fta.go.kr/pds/
fta_korea/chile/eng/Text_of_Agreement.pdf.
42
Free Trade Agreement between the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Singapore,
Sing.-S. Kor., Aug. 4, 2005 (entered into force Mar. 2, 2006), available at
http://www.fta.go.kr/pds/fta_korea/singapore/kor/KSFTA.pdf.
43
Free Trade Agreement between the Republic of Korea and the European Union, Eur. Free
Trade Ass’n-S. Kor., Dec. 15, 2005 (entered into force Sept. 1, 2006), available at
http://www.fta.go.kr/new/pds/fta_korea/eu/pdf_eng/Full_Text.pdf.
44
Agreement on Investment Under the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic
Cooperation Among the Governments of the Republic of Korea and the Member Countries
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, June 2, 2009 (entered into force Sept. 1,
2009).
45
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement between the Republic of Korea and the
Republic of India, India-S. Kor., Aug. 7, 2009 (entered into force Jan. 1, 2010), available at
http://www.fta.go.kr/pds/fta_korea/india/eng/ALL_OF_CEPA_E.pdf.
46
Korea and the E.U. signed the Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the
Republic of Korea and the European Union (Korea-E.U. FTA) on Oct. 6, 2010, and agreed
to bring the agreement into effect beginning July 1, 2011. See Press Release, MOFAT,
Korea-EU Free Trade Agreement to Enter into Force on July 1, 2011 (Sept. 20, 2010),
available at http://www.mofat.go.kr/webmodule/htsboard/template/read/engboardread.jsp?
typeID=12&boardid=302&seqno=309370&c=TITLE&t=&pagenum=14&tableName=TYP
E_ENGLISH&pc=undefined&dc=&wc=&lu=&vu=&iu=&du=.

2011]

THE UNITED STATES – KOREA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT

123

engaged in FTA negotiations with Canada, Mexico, Australia, New
Zealand, Peru, Colombia and Japan. 47 Korea has already completed
preliminary studies for the FTA together with China and is also expected to
enter into FTA negotiations with China in the near future.48
On the other hand, since NAFTA with Mexico and Canada, the
United States has entered into bilateral FTAs with Singapore, Jordan,
Bahrain, Israel, Chile, CAFTA-DR (Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua), Australia, Morocco,
Oman, and Peru.49 The U.S. government has also signed FTAs with Korea,
Panama, and Colombia. Currently, FTA negotiations are under way with
Malaysia, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates.50 The United States is
also a party to the FTAA negotiations and the Trans-Pacific Partnership.51
While it has shown interest in making an FTA with Japan, the third largest
economy in the world, commencement of negotiations has been impeded
by disputes over agricultural issues.52
B. Social Impacts of FTA
The goals of recent FTAs — particularly those promoted by the
United States — go well beyond removal of trade barriers to promote trade
in goods and services: they include provisions that are designed to affect a
broader range of domestic policies, including enforcement of intellectual
property rights, protection of investment activities, establishment of
environmental and labor standards, transparency in applications of
domestic laws and regulations, and establishment of investment dispute
settlement processes outside national court systems. This type of FTA is
designed to bring a range of relevant laws and practices of the signatory

47

The progress of Korea’s various FTA negotiations is chronicled by MOFAT. See
MOFAT, FTA Status of Korea, http://www.mofat.go.kr/english/econtrade/fta/issues/
index2.jsp. The negotiations with Japan have been suspended over agricultural issues since
November 2004, though “working level consultations” were reestablished from 2008
onwards. Yon-Se Kim, Korea, Japan Struggling to Resume FTA Talks, KOR. TIMES, June
25, 2008, available at http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/11/
242_26529.html; see also MOFAT, FTA Status of Korea: Korea-Japan FTA,
http://www.mofat.go.kr/english/econtrade/fta/consideration/Japan/index.jsp.
48
See Yoo, China, supra note 22, at 1. A joint feasibility study of the China-Korea FTA,
composed by academics and representatives of government and industry from both
countries, was completed on May 28, 2010 after three and half years of work. They
produced a report showing that the FTA will contribute to economic cooperation between
the two countries and the economic integration of the Northeast Asian region.
49
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, Free Trade Agreements,
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Section_Index.html.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
CHANLETT-AVERY, ISSUES, supra note 18.
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trading partners in line with those of the United States in order to create a
favorable regulatory environment for U.S. businesses.53 Provisions of the
comprehensive FTA also carry certain social and political preferences, such
as environmental and labor standards, which go beyond the realm of
traditional trade liberalization.54
Thus, the comprehensive FTA has potentially significant
consequences not only for trade practices of the signatory countries, but
also for their overall economic, cultural, and social policies.55 For example,
the United States demanded that the screen quota in Korea be reduced as a
precondition for the initiation of the negotiations of the Korea-U.S. FTA.
This quota, in fact, does not restrict the import of foreign movie films but
mandates the number of days that Korean movie theaters must show only
Korean movies. The reduction in the screen quota would not only make it
easier for theatres to show foreign movies, but it would also affect the
Korean cultural policy of protecting the minimal commercial viability of

53

By way of example, in the course of lengthy negotiations for the U.S.-Korea FTA, each
the two countries was engaged in intensive research into relevant statutes and precedents of
the other. This research concerned both legal and factual aspects and was needed to get an
accurate glimpse of how the agreement would actually operate in the two countries, mainly
because the purpose of the agreement is to adjust respective domestic policies in accordance
with the standards set in the U.S.-Korea FTA. Although this adjustment would not be
economic integration per se, it still indicates that close policy coordination, one way or
another, by the two governments is expected to arise from the agreement. See Jaemin Lee,
Minimizing the Aftershocks of the Korea-U.S. FTA: How to Manage Disputes Arising from
the Two Countries’ Discrepant Perspectives and Legal Systems in On Korea, 2 KEI
ACADEMIC PAPER SERIES 29, 30–33, Feb. 2009, available at http://www.keia.org/
Publications/AcademicPaperSeries/2008/LeeJaemin.pdf.
54
On March 27, 2007, Congress announced a “new trade policy,” which calls for the USTR
to:
- Require countries to adopt, maintain and enforce basic international labor
standards in their domestic laws and practices – not merely to “enforce their
own laws.”
- Promote sustainable development and combat global warming by requiring
countries to implement and enforce common Multilateral Environmental
Agreements, and address illegal logging of mahogany in Peru.
- Re-establish a fair balance between promoting access to medicines in
developing countries and protecting pharmaceutical innovation.
- Promote U.S. national security by protecting operations at U.S. ports.
- Ensure that [any] trade agreement accords “no greater rights” to foreign
investors in the U.S. than to U.S. investors.
Press Release, Trade Subcomm. Chairman Sander Levin, Rangel and Levin Unveil New
Trade Policy for America: Plan Incorporates Changes to Strengthen Pending FTAs and
Regain Bipartisan Consensus (Mar. 27, 2007), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/
press/mi12_levin/pr032707.shtml.
55
LEE, RECLAIMING, supra note 39, at 151–152.
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Korean movies and arts.56 On this issue, opinions about the justification for
the screen quota vary among Koreans, and many have argued that the
prosperous Korean movie industry no longer requires such protection. At
any rate, the Korean government’s cultural and social policies, such as the
screen quota, which aimed at protecting and preserving cultural activities
will be challenged under the call for increased market access for foreign
exports whenever these policies clash with foreign trade interests,
regardless of whether these policies target foreign trade per se.
Another hypothetical example is the Korean universal health care
system, which may prove to be an impediment to the operations of foreign
for-profit hospitals and insurance companies. This is because of the
monopoly the publicly funded system has over primary health care in
Korea. If this health care system were to be abolished or reformed in order
to create a better business environment for foreign hospitals, insurance
companies and pharmaceutical companies, then the Korean health care
policy would fundamentally change, as would the way in which health care
is provided to the Korean population.57 Suspension of the public health
authorities’ mandatory drug price review and authorization process — or
limitation of the price regulation mechanism during the review process58 —
may also be expected to drive up public health insurance premiums to
cover the higher cost of foreign drugs. It may then cause difficulty in
maintaining the currently favorable premium for low-income families,
which has been an important social policy in Korea. Although it is still too
early to tell how the proposed FTA with the United States would implicate
these important policy areas, these examples do indicate that the promotion
of a comprehensive or higher level FTA may lead to fundamental changes
in an array of domestic, social, economic, and cultural policies of the
signatories. In this respect, there is a possibility that the U.S.-Korea FTA

56

It is noteworthy that recently the United Nations sponsored a multilateral convention to
recognize the authority of countries to adopt policies to preserve their respective cultural
identities, which was accepted almost universally. See Convention on the Protection and
Promotion of Cultural Diversity, art. 1 para. h, United Nations Educ., Scientific, and
Cultural Org. (“UNESCO”), Oct. 20, 2005, UNESCO Doc. No. CLT-2005/Convention
Diversité-Cult. Rev.2, available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001429/
142919e.pdf.
57
The reduction of the screen quota has already been implemented at the request of the
United States, but the abolition or amendment of the universal health care coverage is only a
hypothetical example. Although it has been suggested that the current pharmaceutical
provisions in the draft FTA can have a significant impact on the Korean health care system,
the Korean government has neither announced any possibility of abolishing or amending the
current health care system nor has the United States made any official demand to this effect.
See infra notes 154 to 158 and accompanying text.
58
Id.
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may work as a legal framework that would affect important regulatory and
policy mechanisms of Korea in a way that Korea has not envisioned.59
C. Economic Impacts
FTAs can also have a significant impact on the economic
development of the signatory countries. If an FTA is entered into between
nations that are in different stages of economic development, and as a result
the trade barriers are abolished, the nation in the lower stages of
development may lose its ability to adopt trade measures for the protection
and development of its own industries. This would entrench the existing
industrial structure of that nation at the time when the FTA was entered
into, making it harder for the nation to develop industries in which the
other trading partner nation had an advantage.60 On the other hand, an
argument has been made that the opposite effect may be likely, in that the
FTA may facilitate structural changes. The latter argument seems to
highlight that the signatory country may develop industries in which it has
a competitive advantage, but this argument tends to disregard the critical
possibility that the FTA may eliminate the potential for nurturing a
competitive advantage in industries that are not initially competitive vis-àvis their foreign counterparts by taking away the ability of the domestic
government to adopt trade-related industrial policies to protect such
industries. If such industries are exposed to full competition by superior
foreign industries as a result of acceding to an FTA, future development of
these industries would be very difficult. For example, if the Korean
automobile market had been open to foreign imports, as it is now, with
little or no trade barriers during the 1960s and the 1970s, when the Korean
automobile industry was in its incipient stage and, therefore, substantially
weaker than those of Japan or the United States, Korean automobiles would
have been unable to compete with the superior foreign-made automobiles
as they do now. The revenue base of the Korean automobile industry

59

See Chol Lee, Policy Statement, FTA, KORUS FTA, and Challenges of the Labor
Movement (Aug. 31, 2006) [hereinafter Lee, Challenges], available at http://kctu.org/?
module=file&act=procFileDownload&file_srl=3267&sid=d8ca1ababfffd479bbd440605527
dd01 (explaining, from Lee Chol’s vantage as Deputy Director at the Policy Department of
the Federation of Korea Trade Unions [FKTU], the meaning of core provisions of the
Korea-U.S. FTA as well as reasons for which “it is so problematic” and its consequences for
organized labor).
60
See Lee, FDI, supra note 39, at 704–08 (citing Ha-Joon Chang’s study which
demonstrates that “virtually all developed countries today adopted industrial promotion
policies [at some stage in their past development history] to establish some manufacturing
basis with the extensive use of subsidies and trade protections. . . .,” and concluding that
“trade protection, although discounted by many ‘mainstream’ economists for creating
economic inefficiency, is closely relevant to development.”).
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would have been eradicated, and it would have been difficult for the
industry to grow into the internationally-competitive industry that is
today.61
Negative effects on the economic development of the services trade
may result under the U.S.-Korea FTA. This is particularly the case in
current trends of services markets liberalization, where market opening is
focused on capital-intensive service sectors such as the financial sectors in
which developed countries have competitive advantage; and less so in areas
in which developing countries have competitive advantage. For instance,
while developing countries can provide ample supply of labor through
movement of natural persons, this has been, in fact, tightly controlled and
little market access negotiations have been undertaken in this area because
of domestic employment and security issues.62 In the aftermath of the 2008
economic downturn, some countries adopted immigration regulation that
further restricted the opportunities for foreign service providers to provide
services in their domestic service markets.63 Even if reasonable labor
market opening was to be agreed on, the unique difficulties associated with
the movement of labor, such as language barriers, cultural differences, and
the hardships of family separation, would make it rather difficult for
developing countries to enjoy their competitive advantage of having a large
61

There is substantial debate around the validity of infant industry promotion policy. See
LEE, RECLAIMING, supra note 39, ch. 3.1 (explaining that in order to understand the true
relationship between economic development and government promotion of homegrown
industries, “[i]t is essential to consider historic and empirical evidence. . . .”). Nonetheless,
recent historical studies have shown that today’s developed countries developed their
economies in the past through various government industrial facilitation policies and trade
protection. See HA-JOON CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER: DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ch. 2 (2003); see also supra note 60.
62
Some bilateral FTA negotiations have expanded the number of “working visas” to be
granted to parties’ professional service workers. This indicates the close relationship
between opening of service markets and immigration regulation. Tight immigration
regulation would carry the potential of virtually vitiating or reducing the actual benefit of
service market opening.
63
See, e.g., American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Div. A, Title XVI, § 1611
(2009). Section 1611 is called the “Employ American Workers Act.” This Act regards
recipients of funding from the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) as “H-1B Dependent
Employers” under the relevant U.S. immigration regulation (i.e., 20 C.F.R. § 655.736
(2001)) and imposes tight restrictions on these companies’ recruitment of foreign
professional service providers. As a consequence, all things being equal, these companies
and other companies who may envision future application for TARP funding refrain from
employing foreign professional service providers who are willing to provide their services in
the U.S. market. This may negatively affect the penetration of foreign service providers in
the U.S. service market, even if the market is open in a technical or legal sense; see also
Joint Press Statement, E.U.-ROK 2010 Brussels Summit (Oct. 7, 2010), available at
http://www.mofat.go.kr/english/press/MinistryNews/20101007/1_13155.jsp (reporting the
content of E.U. and Korean leaders’ announcements after signing the Korea-E.U. FTA at the
2010 E.U.-ROK summit).
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amount of low cost labor in the services trade. For this reason, the
liberalization of the service trade will arguably offer more export benefits
to developed countries than developing ones.
As will be discussed later, the U.S.-Korea FTA service
negotiations seem to have reflected this trend, and the focus of the
agreement was on the liberalization of capital-intensive service markets
such as financial services and broadcasting services. The U.S. service
industries are expected to benefit more from the liberalization of services
trade under the FTA, while the export benefits to the Korean service
industries are expected to be limited by the significant gap in the
productivity between the two countries’ service industries.64 Many U.S.
service industries are among the most competitive in the world even though
the recent financial crisis revealed problems with their operations. If
Korean service industries, which are smaller in size and have lower
productivity, face open competition with the larger and more efficient U.S.
service industries, they may well lose their domestic sales base, and their
growth potential will probably be negatively affected. 65 This could
potentially lead to a long-term domestic economic loss outweighing the
short-term increases in consumer welfare and gross domestic product (GDP)
gains66 from the higher economic efficiency resulting from free trade in this
area.
Liberalization of the services trade under the FTA will potentially
have a much more significant economic impact than liberalization of the
goods market, where trade barriers have consistently been lowered since
the GATT era.67 Trade liberalization in the service area only began after
64

See Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development [OECD], OECD in
Figures 2005: Statistics on the Member Countries, (Oct. 27, 2005) [hereinafter OECD,
Figures] http://www.oecd.org/document/62/0,3746,en_2825_500246_2345918_1_1_1_1
,00.html (showing that the average labor productivity of Korean service industries is
reported at around 40% of that of the United States). According to the Korea Institute for
International Economic Policy (KIEP), if 20% of the trade barriers were lifted the Korean
trade balance in the service industries would worsen by US$1.8 billion.
65
Some have argued that this type of protectionism is a form of Mercantilism. However,
this position is distinct from traditional Mercantilism in the sense that the focus of the
protection is on growth potential rather than on the current state of an industry and its profits
against foreign competitors.
66
According to KIEP, consumer welfare and real GDP in Korea after the U.S.-Korea FTA
will increase by 1.73% and 1.99%, respectively. See Han-Mi FTA Chaegyul Ttae Shiljil
GDP 1.99% Jungga [After Conclusion of the Korea-U.S. FTA Real GDP Will Increase by
1.99%], CHOSUN ILBO (Jan. 19, 2006), http://www.chosun.com/economy/news/200601/
200601190356.html. But see USITC estimate that the impact of the U.S.-Korea FTA on
economic growth will be much smaller, with GDP “increas[ing only] by 0.2% [for the
United States and 0.7% for Korea] as a result of the FTA.” USITC, Impact, supra note 15,
at 5-2.
67
Since the establishment of the GATT, eight rounds of multilateral trade negotiations were
completed. In each round, tariffs were successfully lowered by an average rate of 35%. As

2011]

THE UNITED STATES – KOREA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT

129

the establishment of the WTO in 1995. The degree of liberalization
remains low because WTO members have been somewhat reluctant to
commit to opening their services market while the economic impact of
market opening remains uncertain. Arguments have been raised that
opening up the services market under the FTA will not only benefit the U.S.
service industries but also those of Korea, the competitiveness of which
could further improve through competition with the U.S. industries. 68
However, more research would be necessary to determine whether the
current competitiveness of the Korean service industries will allow any
meaningful competition with the U.S. counterparts.69 From the perspective
of industrial development, it is pertinent to question whether the Korean
service markets should be opened up incrementally, as opposed to
undergoing an immediate and radical liberalization. 70 The incremental
approach could be modeled after the gradual trade liberalization of the
automobile market, which resulted in the successful industrial development
of Korea’s automobile industry.71
There is concern that the proposed U.S.-Korea FTA, particularly
the liberalization of the services trade, may also worsen the economic
polarization in Korea that has been accelerating since the financial crisis in
1997.72 If the large scale, capital-intensive U.S. service industries were to
a result, after the Uruguay Round negotiations in 1994 the average import tariff rate applied
to manufactured products by developed nations was a mere 3.9%. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 74 (2nd ed. 1997).
68
Kyung-Chul Sun, Briefing to the Korean Government on the U.S.-Korea FTA: To
Become a First Class Nation (Mar. 22, 2006), available at www.fta.go.kr/fta_korea/
interview_view.php?page=1&board_id=989&country_id=19.
69
According to preliminary research conducted by USITC, Korea’s service exports are
expected to decrease by over 5% under the U.S.-Korea FTA, which seems to indicate
deterioration rather than improvement in competitiveness of Korean service industries.
USITC, Impact, supra note 15, at 5-12.
70
The opening of the Korean service market may also be prompted by the result of the
WTO’s currently on-going DDA negotiations, if they are successfully completed in the near
future. As of this writing, it is difficult to predict the extent and terms of the DDA-imposed
market opening of the Korean service market. If Korea, as a result of the DDA negotiations,
assumes an obligation to open up its service market to a similar level as that envisioned in
the U.S.-Korea FTA, discussion of the prospective impact on the Korean services market
from the U.S.-Korea FTA would become moot. As the outcome of the DDA is hard to
predict at the moment, the discussion in this paper on this issue is premised on the notion
that the current services trade regime of Korea under the WTO remains the same for the
time being.
71
Hang-Koo Lee, Carmakers Succeeded in Localizing Foreign Models, KOR. TIMES (July 9,
2010), http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2010/12/291_69133.html.
72
According to a recent report of the Korean Ministry of Finance and Economy, the Gini
Coefficient worsened from 0.283 in 1997 to 0.310 in 2004 (the value of the Gini Coefficient
ranges from 0 to 1, where 1 represents the highest income inequality). Jong-Hak Weon &
Myung-Jae Sung, Sodeugbunbae Gyeogcha Hwagdaeui Woningwa Jeongchaegdaeeung
Banghyang [Causes of Increasing Income Inequality in Korea and Policy Suggestions],
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actively enter the Korean services market, those Korean individuals and
companies that have the ability and the capital to cooperate with them will
share in some portion of the profits. Meanwhile, the domestic service
suppliers operating with relatively smaller capital will probably be
excluded, and could experience significant difficulties in attempting to stay
in business. 73 Although consumer welfare can increase through the
advancement of these efficient foreign service industries,74 and perhaps
more jobs may also be created,75 especially in temporary employment, if
the domestic service industries collapse because they are unable to compete,
then the resulting loss of individual businesses, combined with the
unemployment problem expected in the agricultural sector after the FTA,76
may actually have the effect of further polarizing the Korean society rather
than bridging it.77 To many observers of this agreement, this perceived
worsening of the economic polarization in Korea has been a cause for
concern.78

KOR. INST. OF PUB. FIN. RESEARCH REPORTS
(2007),
available
at
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CBsQFjAB&url=http%3A%2
F%2F210.218.195.13%2Fbook_pdf%2F%25EC%2597%25B0%25EB%25B3%25B40710_50.pdf&ei=JNiBTdzbN9DdgQfbn7S9CA&usg=AFQjCNG0ObBHXH1DVA1ifKsfe0R
O7Jcvhw&sig2=cDqISS1L6bNnhrwJjzMD9A (in Korean, with English-language abstract
at the end).
73
This situation will be analogous to the dominance of big chain stores, such as Wal-Mart in
the U.S. retail market, and the consequent elimination of small, independent retail stores in
past decades.
74
USITC, Impact, supra note 15, at 5-2.
75
KIEP has estimated that around 100,000 jobs will be created. After Conclusion of the
Korea-U.S. FTA Real GDP Will Increase by 1.99%, CHOSUN ILBO, supra note 66. But see
USITC, Impact, supra note 15, at 5-15 (indicating that the expected change in demand for
labor in the Korean service sector will be minimal, or less than 0.5%, which indicates that
the job increase, if any, will be insignificant).
76
See JIN-KYO SUH & JI-HYUN PARK, Issues in the Agricultural Negotiation of a KoreanU.S. FTA Negotiation and Korea’s Strategies (2007) [hereinafter SUH & PARK, ISSUES]
(estimating that 130,000 to 140,000 jobs will be lost in the agricultural sector),
http://www.kiep.go.kr/include/filedown.jsp?fname=PAIK200619.pdf&fpath=Pub0201&NO
=180389&FNO=864 (in Korean, with English-language abstract at the end). See infra notes
90 to 95 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of agricultural issues and the
FTA.
77
See JIN-KYO SUH & JI-HYUN PARK, Issues in the Agricultural Negotiation of a KoreanU.S. FTA Negotiation and Korea’s Strategies (2007) [hereinafter SUH & PARK, ISSUES]
(estimating that 130,000 to 140,000 jobs will be lost in the agricultural sector), available at
http://www.kiep.go.kr/include/filedown.jsp?fname=PAIK200619.pdf&fpath=Pub0201&NO
=180389&FNO=864 (in Korean, with English-language abstract at the end). See infra notes
90 to 95 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of agricultural issues and the
FTA.
78
Korean Minister of Finance and Economy Duk-Soo Han asserted at a workshop held by
Korea’s ruling party (Apr. 2, 2006) that reinforcing the social safety network to help
socially-disadvantaged classes is in line with the U.S.-Korea FTA.
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Moreover, the liberalization of the services market under the FTA
may have to be extended beyond the trade between the United States and
Korea by operation of relevant WTO rules. According to relevant
provisions of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), if
service industries are opened up through the U.S.-Korea FTA, the door
may also have to be opened to the other WTO member nations that provide
such services in either of these countries through local investment. The
exclusive preferential treatment under an FTA is allowed as an exception to
the requirement of the most favored nation (MFN) principle that prevents
arbitrary discriminations among trading partners. Article 2 of GATS
requires MFN treatment for services trade,79 and GATS Article 5 authorizes
FTAs as an exception to the MFN principle, allowing preferential treatment
under an FTA to be applied exclusively to the trade between the signatories
of that FTA.80 However, even with the GATS Article 5 exception, if a
service supplier is incorporated under the laws of the FTA signatory
country it is regarded as qualified to receive the full FTA privileges of
service suppliers from that country, even though in some sense this supplier
is not originally from the particular FTA signatory country.81
Therefore, some consideration should be given to this (perhaps)
unintended result. If the services markets were to be opened under the
U.S.-Korea FTA, it may in effect become opened to service providers from
other WTO members that are incorporated in either the United States or
Korea. It should also be noted that the reciprocity between the signatories
of the FTA does not apply to these other WTO members: they do not have
to open their own services market beyond the concessions which they have
already made in the WTO multilateral trade negotiations. Nevertheless,
these member countries will enjoy, albeit indirectly, the benefit of the
service market liberalization under the FTA if their service suppliers
provide services through corporations set up in one of the signatory
countries. Consequently, by operation of GATS Article 5.6, the signatories
of the FTA may also lose their negotiation leverage in WTO service trade
negotiations to the extent that they have or will have opened their services
market to service providers from non-FTA signatory WTO members and
which are incorporated in the signatory countries. As such, the total benefit

79

See General Agreement on Trade in Services [GATS] art. 2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, in
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 287 (1999) [hereinafter WTO, THE LEGAL TEXTS]
(providing in article 2(1) that “each Member shall accord immediately and unconditionally
to services and service suppliers of any other Member treatment no less favourable than that
it accords to like services and service suppliers of any other country. . . .”); available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm.
80
GATS art. 5.
81
Id. para. 5.
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from the services market opening through an FTA would require careful
consideration of all these multi-dimensional issues beyond enhancement of
competition and consumer welfare.
IV.

KEY ISSUES IN THE U.S.-KOREA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
A. Overall Observations

The U.S.-Korea FTA proposes to achieve massive trade
liberalization, by removing over 90% tariffs for manufactured products in
three years, and eventually eliminating all of them; all market restrictions
are to be lifted for agricultural products except rice.82 Yet, the overall
prospect of the U.S.-Korea FTA would only become ascertainable if one
would scrutinize how the bilateral trade actually plays out under the
agreement. For instance, regardless of reciprocal elimination or reduction
of tariffs, the application of the rule to the actual situation may lead to
imbalance in trade benefits expected to result from the agreement. Korea’s
major export industries such as automobiles, shipbuilding, electronics and
semiconductors, are not expected to benefit much under the FTA because
U.S. import tariffs on these products are already low, ranging from 0% to
2.5%.83 In addition, the recent experience of Korea is that the actual
impediments to Korean exports to the United States are U.S. antidumping
measures, countervailing duties, and extraterritorial applications of antitrust
laws, rather than tariffs.84 All major Korean exporters in these areas have
had vivid experience in coping with these measures of the United States.85
82

See Press Release, MOFAT, Han-Mi Jayu Muyeog Hyeobjeong (FTA) Bunyabyeol
Choejong Hyeobsang Gyeolgwa [Final Korea-U.S. FTA Negotiation Results for Each
Sector] (Apr. 4, 2007) [hereinafter MOFAT, Final Negotiation Results],
http://www.fta.go.kr/new/ftakorea/broadpsd.asp?country_idx=19 (use arrows to look for
press release no. 112, dated Feb. 4, 2007). See generally USITC, USITC PUB. 3949, U.S.KOREA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: POTENTIAL ECONOMY-WIDE AND SELECTED SECTORAL
EFFECTS (Inv. No. TA-2104-24, 2007), available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/
pub3949.pdf.
83
It has also been pointed out that the rapidly increasing overseas production of Korean
export industries will diminish the benefits from the FTA. See Lee Hae-Yeong Kyosu 'HanMi FTA, Choidae Gukjae Sagigug [Professor Hae-Yeong Lee: ‘Korea-U.S. FTA Is Worst
International Fraud], CHOSUN ILBO, June 16, 2007, http://news.chosun.com/site/data/
html_dir/2007/06/16/2007061600073.html.
84
Seventy-five antidumping and countervailing duty investigations were initiated by the
United States against Korean exports from 1965 to 2005, and a total of US$37.3 billion
worth of Korean exports were subjected to U.S. trade measures from 1985 to 2005. KOREA
TRADE COMMISSION, MUYEOGGUJE GWANLYEON TONG-GYE [FOREIGN TRADE REMEDY
INVESTIGATION STATISTICS] (2010), available at http://www.ktc.go.kr/kboard/view.jsp?bm
=15&pg=1&bd=999999925 [hereinafter KTC, STATISTICS].
85
If trade disputes provide any reliable barometer for the extent of the trade measures that
Korean exporters face, during the 2007-2008 period when the U.S.-Korea FTA was agreed
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Particularly, antidumping investigations by the United States against
Korean exporters have been a perennial source of concern for both industry
and the government.86 Unfortunately, it is apparent that the United States is
not prepared to remove these barriers for the benefit of Korean exports.
Former USTR Rob Portman declared that the United States would not
change its laws and systems because of the U.S.-Korea FTA, which would
govern those trade measures.87 Thus, an argument can be made that Korean
exporters will continue to deal with their major hurdles even in the postU.S.-Korea FTA era, while their U.S. counterparts, particularly in the areas
of agriculture, pharmaceuticals, and services, stand to gain significantly.88
The result from these imbalanced FTA gains has the potential of shifting
the overall trade balance more in favor of the United States. According to

upon and legislative ratifications were pursued, there were eight disputes at the WTO
dispute settlement procedure that involved various trade frictions between the two countries,
either as direct parties or indirect parties (i.e., third parties). See Panel Report, European
Communities — Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/R (June 30,
2010); Appellate Body Report, United States — Continued Existence and Application of
Zeroing Methodology, WT/DS350/AB/R (Feb. 4, 2009); Appellate Body Report, United
States — Measures Relating to Shrimp from Thailand, WT/DS343/AB/R (July 16, 2008);
Appellate Body Report, Japan — Countervailing Duties on Dynamic Random Access
Memories from Korea, WT/DS336/AB/R (Nov. 28, 2007); Panel Report, United States —
Anti-Dumping Measure on Shrimp from Ecuador, WT/DS335/R (Jan. 30, 2007); Appellate
Body Report, United States — Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews,
WT/DS322/AB/R (Jan. 9, 2007); Request for Consultations by the United States, European
Communities and Certain Member States — Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil
Aircraft — Second Complaint, WT/DS347/1 (Jan. 31, 2006); Appellate Body Report, United
States — Laws, Regulations and Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins (Zeroing),
WT/DS294/AB/R (Apr. 18, 2006); Request for Consultations by the European
Communities, United States — Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft — Second
Complaint, WT/DS353/1 (June 27, 2005); Request for Consultations by the European
Communities, United States — Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft,
WT/DS317/1 (Oct. 6, 2004). These cases are compiled and made available at WORLD TRADE
ORG., Chronological List of Disputes Cases, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/
dispu_status_e.htm. In these disputes, Korea and the United States have shown sharply
divided opinions on key trade issues. In the same time period, there were five separate
investigations by the U.S. government into a wide range of governmental policies of Korea
for various subsidy allegations, while there were none initiated by Korea against the United
States.
86
During the period of 1995–2008, the United States initiated twenty-nine antidumping
investigations against Korea. Among the antidumping duty orders that followed from these
investigations, eleven orders from the United States Department of Commerce are still in
place. KOREA TRADE COMMISSION, FOREIGN TRADE REMEDY INVESTIGATIONS STATISTICS,
supra note 83.
87
Letter from Rob Portman, U.S. Trade Rep., to Ted Stevens, President Pro Tempore of the
Senate, and Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the House (Feb. 2, 2006) [hereinafter Portman,
Letter], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2006-02-02/html/CREC-200602-02-pt1-PgS503.htm.
88
See supra notes 15 and 64.
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the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP), Korea’s
current trade surplus with the United States will shrink by US$5.1 billion.
The United States International Trade Commission (USITC) estimates that
reduction at US$9 billion.
With this overall picture of imbalance in the background, a series
of key issues emerged in the negotiations for the U.S.-Korea FTA.
Significant disagreements arose in certain areas, including agriculture,
textiles, pharmaceuticals, services, intellectual property rights, investment,
government procurement, sanitary and phytosanitary measures,
environment and labor, regulatory issues, trade measures, and rules of
origin. As discussed above, some of these issues go beyond removal of
trade barriers per se and have far-reaching effects on an array of domestic
policies. In most areas, the two countries attempted to strike a balance of
interests between the two and in the process U.S. demands were largely
accommodated by the Korean government. However, it is not entirely clear
whether Korea could garner tangible benefits in some of its key interest
areas, including trade remedy measures, working visa issues, coastal
shipping services, and rules of origin issues with respect to textiles.89 The
remainder of this section provides a discussion of the negotiated results of
the U.S.-Korea FTA in selected areas and their implications.
B. Agriculture and Textiles
One of the most critical issues in the U.S.-Korea FTA negotiations
was agriculture. The United States has been demanding removal of tariffs
and non-tariff barriers in agricultural trade in various bilateral and
multilateral trade negotiations, and this negotiation stance was also
expected in the U.S.-Korea FTA negotiations. The agriculture issue, which
had been the main deterrent keeping Japan and Switzerland from entering
into an FTA with the United States, was no less critical for Korea, where
opening the agricultural market was expected to cause critical injury to its
agricultural sector. The success of the U.S.-Korea FTA had depended
largely on the outcome of the negotiations in this area.

89

Other commentators also pointed out that to have an FTA with Korea, the United States
would have to set aside long-standing trade barriers to Korean exports and resolve visa
issues in return for the gains from the areas of U.S. interest, such as agriculture. See, e.g.,
Jeffrey J. Schott et al., Negotiating the Korea – United States Free Trade Agreement 14
(Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ., Policy Brief No. PB06-4, 2006) [hereinafter Schott,
Negotiating], http://www.piie.com/publications/interstitial.cfm?ResearchID=639 (“If the
United States wants an FTA with Korea, it will have to put long-standing US barriers to
Korean exports on the negotiating table and resolve vexing problems regarding access to the
US visa waiver program.”). However, Korea agreed to the FTA without attaining most of
these key interests.
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The Korean agriculture sector in most product groups is
significantly less competitive than its U.S. counterpart. The 2001 USITC
report estimated that the export of U.S. agricultural goods to Korea would
increase by 200% once the FTA comes into effect.90 Research by the
Korea Rural Economic Institute (KREI) also estimated that Korean
production would decrease by US$20-23 billion, and that 130,000 to
140,000 jobs would be lost in the agricultural sector.91 Opening up the
agriculture sector goes directly to the question of the very survival of
Korean agriculture. The expected job losses, mounting to the hundreds of
thousands, could not only further aggravate the economic polarization
problem discussed in the preceding section, but also cause massive
desertion of agricultural areas. In turn, this would lead to serious social,
environmental, and economic problems for Korea, which maintained the
position that effective relief for the affected farmers and plans to improve
agricultural competitiveness should precede the liberalization of the
agriculture sector.
There has been also another fundamental issue with respect to the
opening of the agriculture market. Agricultural trade has been already
distorted by large government subsidies that are allowed in the WTO
Agreement on Agriculture, and a question is raised whether it could be
justified to call for the opening of the agricultural market where exported
agricultural products have been subsidized by the government. In 2006,
U.S. agriculture subsidies amounted to US$24.4 billion, which was 10.2%
of the total agricultural production, whereas Korean subsidies were only
US$2.4 billion, or 6.4% of the total production.92 While consumer welfare
in the agriculture importing countries could increase thanks to the cheaper
imported agricultural products, it would be done at the expense of domestic
agricultural producers, and competition between domestic and imported
agricultural products would not be fair to domestic producers when the
exporting country subsidizes production of its agricultural products. The
call for liberalization of agricultural trade seems to be misplaced unless
government subsidies were ultimately removed; and real comparative
advantages could only be reflected in agricultural trade free of the current
trade distortions caused by agricultural subsidies.
In the final state of the negotiation, Korea agreed to provide market
access to all agricultural products except rice, notwithstanding the issues
raised above. According to the USTR, almost two-thirds of U.S.
90

USITC, Impact, supra note 15, at 5-1.
SUH & PARK, ISSUES, supra note 76.
92
OECD Database, PRODUCER AND CONSUMER SUPPORT ESTIMATES DATABASE, available at
http://www.oecd.org/document/59/0,3746,en_2649_33797_39551355_1_1_1_1,00&&enUSS_01DBC.html, cited in YOUN-JOONG KIM ET AL., KOR. RURAL ECON. INST.,
INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE STUDY OF KOREAN AGRICULTURE BY STATISTICAL DATA
(2009).
91
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agricultural exports will be immediately duty-free (US$1.91 billion duty
free out of US$2.96 billion 2004-2006 averages). Current tariffs for the
remaining products, including beef and pork, will be eliminated after a
transitional period ranging from two to twenty years, with an exception of a
small number of specified items.93 The parties have also agreed on new
tariff rate quotas (TRQ) for specific items, to be applied up until those
tariffs are completely eliminated. 94 Any tariffs on goods that are not
specified in the TRQ schedule will be progressively eliminated.95
Textiles were another key area for the FTA negotiations. Textile
and clothing products were finally incorporated into the open trading
regime under the WTO after the expiration of the Agreement on Textile and
Clothing in January 2005. Korea is a net exporter of textile products and
pressed the United States in the FTA negotiations to increase market access
and relax its rules of origin, so-called “yarn-forwarding,” to promote
exports of Korean textile products into the U.S. market. In turn, the United
States demanded the adoption of a special safeguard against rapid increases
in textile imports to protect its domestic textile producers. Both parties
have agreed to eliminate tariffs for all textile and clothing products in ten
years, with an immediate tariff elimination for 87% of the product items
imported into the United States and 97% of those imported into Korea,
respectively.96 Both countries have also agreed on a special safeguard
mechanism allowing imposition of tariffs on the occurrence of injury
following unexpected import surges.97
The United States and Korea also showed considerable differences
on the standards to determine the rule of origin in the textile area. The
principal issue was the “yarn-forward” rule adopted by the United States,
which requires the yarn and fabric used in apparel to come from either the
United States or the trading partner in question for textile products to be
recognized as made in that trading partner country. Korea imports most of
its yarn from third countries to make textile products, and consequently
these products will not qualify for non-tariff treatment under this rule of
origin.98 Nevertheless, the controversial “yarn-forward” rule has still been
agreed on, with certain product exceptions in Korea’s interest. 99

93

See, e.g., Trade Facts: Free Trade with Korea – Detailed Summary of the KORUS FTA,
USTR FTA Fact Sheet (Office of the US Trade Representative, Apr. 2007) [hereinafter
USTR, Fact Sheet], available at www.amchamkorea.org/publications/Download.php?id=
128.
94
KORUS FTA, supra note 1, art. 3.2, para. 1.
95
Id. art. 2.3, para. 2.
96
MOFAT, Final Negotiation Results, supra note 82.
97
See KORUS FTA, supra note 1.
98
Chan-Hee Kim, Double Standard on Rules of Origin, KOOKMIN ILBO, Nov. 1, 2006 (in
Korean).
99
MOFAT, Final Negotiation Results, supra note 82.
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Interestingly, the United States took an apparently opposite approach with
respect to bovine meat. The United States demanded the “country of
slaughter” rule to be used instead of “born, raised and slaughtered (BRS)”
rule of origin.100 Under the “country of slaughter” rule, cattle raised in
Canada and slaughtered in the United States will be conferred a U.S.
country of origin. This was a cause for concern on the part of Korea
because of the occurrence of “mad cow disease” in Canadian cattle,101 but
the parties ultimately agreed on this rule.
C. Access to Services Market
The services sector is the area in which the United States has
competitive advantage,102 and, therefore, the United States would make
significant efforts to expand entry into the Korean services market. To this
end, the United States raised a number of regulatory issues related to the
entry into the Korean market, in an effort to remove regulatory barriers to
U.S. service export. The United States adopted a comprehensive approach:
i.e. opening up various service sectors at the same time, including finances,
telecommunications, professional services markets, and other servicerelated industries. As discussed in the preceding section, the economic and
social effects of liberalizing the services trade can be more far-reaching
than in goods trade; nevertheless, the two countries seemed to have
proceeded with negotiations with regard to the liberalization of services
trade without sufficient research on its impact on relevant service sectors
and on the economy and society at large.103
The negotiators on both sides identified areas of services for which
market access request was made. These areas included financial services,

100

Id.
Since May 2003, there have been 17 instances of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
(BSE) in Canada. On the other hand, the United States has had only three instances of BSE
in this same period.
See Overview of BSE in North America, CDC.GOV,
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvrd/bse (last visited Mar. 17, 2011) (using a visual diagram to
report incidence of BSE cases in the U.S. and Canada from 1993 to 2011).
102
OECD, Figures, supra note 64, at 30-33. There is a significant gap in the productivity of
services industries between the United States and Korea.
103
From the Korean point of view, perhaps this impact is now more limited than expected
because the USTR clarified that it was neither seeking to change the non-profit requirement
of the Korean health care and education systems, nor to have these markets opened to
relevant U.S. service providers. See Press Release, MOFAT, Han-mi FTA Je 1 Cha
Gongsig Hyeobsang Gyeolgwa [Results of the First Round of Official Korea-U.S. FTA
Negotiations]
(June
9,
2006)
[hereinafter
MOFAT,
First
Round],
http://www.fta.go.kr/new/ftakorea/broadpsd.asp?country_idx=19 (use arrows to look for
press release no. 34, dated June 9, 2006). Nonetheless, the opening of the services market
without due consideration of its various potential impacts may lead to unanticipated
economic and social problems in the future.
101
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professional services, telecommunications, electronic commerce, and
broadcasting. Both countries have agreed to adopt a Mutual Recognition
Arrangement (MRA) for veterinarians, architects, and engineers. 104
However, the United States has not conceded on the issue of temporary
visas for corporate executives and the visa quota for professionals. 105
Korea also requested the U.S. coastal shipping market be opened to Korean
shippers, but it was not accepted by the United States.106 There were
discussions as to whether the FTA should be applied to the Korea
Development Bank and Industrial Bank of Korea which mainly operate as
commercial banks but which sometimes take the role of conduit of
governmental policy loan programs. They have been included in the
reservation list along with Korea Housing Finance Corporation, the
National Agricultural Cooperative Federation, and the National Federation
of Fisheries Cooperatives.107 The United States also exerted pressure on
Korea to open its broadcasting market. According to the proposed U.S.Korea FTA, both countries are to afford the MFN treatment to other
country’s broadcasting companies.108 Each country may place competitive
safeguards in order to prevent anti-competitive practices such as crosssubsidization.109
As for financial services, in which a number of issues were raised,
the operation of insurance business is limited to subsidiary services such as
damages adjustment under the proposed FTA. The parties have also agreed
not to recognize the capital of the foreign headquarters as part of the
required capital for foreign bank branches.110 The United States has also
agreed on a cap on the foreign-owned shares in the ownership of the
Korean Stock Exchange when it is to be publicly traded. 111 As for
telecommunications services, the United States demanded abolition of the
49% cap of share ownership by foreigners in the core telecommunications
businesses to which Korea agreed to do so within two years.112 The United

104

KORUS FTA, supra note 1, at annex 12-A, available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/
default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/korus/asset_upload_file315_12711.pdf (providing that
“[w]here the Parties agree, each Party shall . . . develop procedures for the temporary
licensing arrangements of professional service suppliers of the other Party with respect to
professional services sectors or subsectors mutually agreed by the Parties).
105
Id. art. 12.1, para. 7.
106
Id. U.S. annex II.
107
Id. Korea annex III-22.
108
Id. art. 18.1, para. 6.
109
Id. art. 14.5.
110
Id. art. 11.14, para. 1.
111
Press Briefing, MOFAT, Han-Mi FTA Je 7 Cha Gongsig Hyeobsang Gyeolgwa, [Results
of the Seventh Round of Official Korea-U.S. FTA Negotiations] [hereinafter MOFAT,
Seventh Round Results] (Feb. 20, 2007), http://www.fta.go.kr/new/ftakorea/broadpsd.asp?
country_idx=19 (use arrows to look for press release no. 86, dated Feb. 20, 2007).
112
USTR, Fact Sheet, supra note 93.
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States also demanded that private businesses be allowed to choose
technical standards.113 In accordance with this demand, safeguard rules
were to be laid down concerning government measures to mandate the use
of specific technologies.114 An agreement has also been made to provide
foreign operators with conditional access to existing telecommunication
networks and facilities.115
D. Intellectual Property Rights
IPR issues go beyond trade, because it has significant impact on
technological development, national economy, and society at large. Traderelated intellectual property rights are controlled by relevant WTO regimes,
namely the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (the TRIPS Agreement), but criticism has been raised as to
whether the IPR issues should be internationally regulated through the rules
of international trade.116 The United States produces the largest number of
patents in the world and has extensive research and development
capabilities. The United States has thus strategically recognized IPR as an
area where it can be competitive in the 21st century, and succeeded in
getting extensive IPR provisions included as part of the WTO Agreements
in the Uruguay Round. Since then, the United States has included
provisions for a high level of IPR protection in its bilateral and multilateral
trade agreements. As expected, the United States demanded strong IPR
protection during the U.S.-Korea FTA negotiations.
While protection of IPR is justified to encourage innovations that
often require costly research and development efforts, it should also be
balanced against the need for dissemination of information.117 Excessive
IPR protection in extent and duration may retard free flow of information
and ultimately impede development of industries, science, and even culture
and arts. This disadvantage would be more substantial for developing
countries in need of advanced technologies for their development
113

MOFAT, Seventh Round Results, supra note 111.
See KORUS FTA, supra note 1, annex 14.21, para. 5 (providing that in ‘adopt[ing] a
measure that mandates the use of a specific technology of standard, or otherwise limits a
supplier’s ability to choose the technology it uses, to supply a telecommunications or valueadded service’, either party to the FTA shall use a rulemaking process that affords notice
and comment opportunities to such suppliers, and permits them to request additional
rulemakings concerning “alternative technolog[ies] or standard[s]”).
115
Id. art. 14.2, paras. 5–6.
116
LEE, RECLAIMING, supra note 39, 123–32.
117
See Preamble to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
annex 1C, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement], in WTO, THE LEGAL
TEXTS,
supra
note
78,
at
321;
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm1_e.htm.
114
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purposes.118 There is a tendency for developed countries to push for more
IPR protection, while developing countries demand fair and affordable
chances to obtain advanced technologies and knowledge for their
development needs.119 The TRIPS Agreement already offers substantial
IPR protection under the multilateral framework.
Under these
circumstances, there should be clear justification as to why it is necessary
to require an even higher level of protection in the FTA context exceeding
the IPR protection that the TRIPS Agreement already offers. The level of
IPR protection demanded under the U.S.-Korea FTA exceeds that of the
TRIPS Agreement as discussed below, but it is not clear whether the U.S.Korea FTA offers such justification.
IPR provisions in the U.S.-Korea FTA exceed TRIPS Agreement
provisions in terms of the duration, extent, and enforcement of IPRs. For
instance, both countries have agreed to extend the duration of copyright to
a period of 70 years after the death of the writer,120 which exceeds the
TRIPS Agreement requirement of 50 years.121 For another example, USTR
describes the trademark protection under the FTA as a “state of the art”
because, among other things, trademark protection extends not only to
certification of conventional marks for trade but also to sound and scent
marks. Online registration of trademarks is also to be protected. In
addition, both countries have agreed to facilitate a searchable database and
to not impose any registration requirement for license to establish the
validity of the license.122 It is true that uncharted territories were covered
by the agreement to strengthen the scope of the IPR protection, but clear
justification in departing from the TRIPS Agreement has yet to come.
Controversy has also risen over the Confirmation Letter on Online
Piracy Prevention under Article 18 of the FTA.123 In the Letter, the Korean
government stated its commitment to shut down internet sites that allow
unauthorized reproduction, distribution, or transmission of copyrighted
works.124 Internet site operators have opposed this provision as an overly
excessive measure because it imposes a unilateral obligation on Korea, not
118

See id. (recognizing the “special needs of the least-developed country Members in
respect of maximum flexibility in the domestic implementation of laws and regulations in
order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base[.]”).
119
Id.
120
KORUS FTA, supra note 1, art. 18.4, para. 4. MOFAT, Final Negotiation Results, supra
note 82.
121
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 116, art. 12.
122
USTR, Fact Sheet, supra note 93.
123
Confirmation Letter on Online Piracy Prevention under Article 18 of the FTA, from
Hyun-Chong Kim, Minister for Trade of the Republic of Kor., to Susan C. Schwab, USTR
Ambassador (June 30, 2007), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/korus/asset_upload_file939_1
2739.pdf.
124
Id.
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the United States, and authorizes the Korean government to shut down
internet sites even for a single occurrence of copyright infringement.125
Another Letter on Limitations of Liability of Internet Service Providers
also is a cause for concern as it requires disclosure of the identity and
contact information of the subscribers who posted unauthorized materials
online, without issuance of proper court warrant. 126 These Letters,
produced under the pressure of the U.S. government to make commitments
for stronger IPR protections, seem to be in line with the history of changes
in the IPR regime of Korea as demanded by the United States.
Korea already experienced sweeping changes in its intellectual
property regime as early as in mid-1980s under the pressure of the United
States, which was equipped with Section 301 sanctions. In 1986, the
Korean government was compelled to introduce a comprehensive copyright
regime by accession to the Universal Copyright Convention and Geneva
Phonograms Convention. Korea made important amendments including
extension of copyright term for the author’s lifetime plus 50 years, and
introduction of protection for computer software, semiconductor chips, and
sound recordings.127 Korea was also required to amend its Patent Act by
introduction of product patent, extension of patent term for 15 years, and
protection of microorganisms.128
Such a radical change in intellectual property law could have
caused negative impacts on the Korean industries and economy, which
were still in their developing stages during the 1980s.129 However, the
performance of Korean economy did not seem to be adversely affected by
the change in the IPR regime, and Korea industries succeeded in
strengthening international competitiveness, which suggests a possibility
that some developing countries, if not all, can not only survive with the
strengthened IPR regime but also use it to improve its industrial
competitiveness. Encouraged by this success record, some believe that
Korea can use the additional changes in the IPR regime required under the

125

Press Release, Korea Internet Business Association (May 28, 2007).
Letter on Limitations of Liability of Internet Service Providers, from Hyun-Chong Kim,
Minister for Trade of the Republic of Kor, to Susan C. Schwab, USTR Ambassador (June
30, 2007),
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/korus/asset_upload_file948_1
2737.pdf.
127
Record of Understanding on Intellectual Property Rights between the Republic of Korea
and the United States of America, U.S.-S.Kor., Aug. 28, 1986, available at
http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/All_Trade_Agreements/exp_005680.asp.
128
Id. sec. B. The Korean Trademark Act was also required to be amended to allow U.S.
trademark owners to freely license their trademarks. See id. sec. C.
129
Korea did not join the OECD until 1996. See William Witherell, Address at the Second
Korea-OECD Conference: Korea in the OECD: Realising the Promise (Dec. 13-14, 2001),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/36/0/2698284.pdf.
126
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FTA for further technological innovation and progress which is yet to be
seen.
E. Investment Protection
The United States began negotiations on investment issues with a
high level of ambition. This is reflected in its earlier statement that U.S.
investors investing in Korea should be guaranteed the same rights granted
by U.S. laws and practices, while Korean investors should not be granted
superior rights to those accorded to domestic investors in the United
States.130 The U.S. objectives revealed in this statement are problematic, as
they go against the principle of reciprocity. As to the former part of the
statement, it would be inappropriate for one nation to impose its own
standards and practices, even if more advanced, on the other with different
legal, social, and economic environments and priorities, unless the other
country’s laws and practices present clear obstacles to foreign investment
and its own standards and practices somehow offer a workable alternative
solution for that other country. Recent bilateral disputes between the two
countries have exposed the difference in perspectives and practices
between the two countries when it comes to the propriety of governmental
policies and laws, which apparently boils down to cultural differences.131

130

Portman, Letter, supra note 87.
In recent high-profile bilateral trade disputes, the United States and Korea registered
sharp differences concerning the role of the government, and the relationship between the
governmental sector and the private sector. It turned out that these differences are largely
based on differing cultural and societal characteristics. See, e.g., World Trade Organization,
United States — Countervailing Duty Investigations on Dynamic Random Access Memory
Semiconductors from Korea, WT/DS296/R (Feb. 21, 2005), at 7.6-7.8, 7.49-7.50, 7.59,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/296r_a_e.pdf (reflecting different
views in the two countries regarding the role of the government in times of national
economic emergency). Indeed, one commentator opined that “law is a form of cultural
expression and is not readily transplantable from one culture to another without going
through some process of indigenization. French law is as much a reflection of the French
culture as Russian law is a reflection of Russian culture.” MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL.,
COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS IN A NUTSHELL 10 (West 1982). Yet another commentator,
Luke Nottage, noted that such cultural difference still plays a role in the administration of
law in Japan, pointing out that continuing tension between the new legal regime and the
traditional legal regime in Japan should be taken into account, where the former has been
affected by the influx of Anglo-American jurisprudence, while the latter is based on the
notion of social values distinct from profit maximization. See Luke Nottage, Nothing New
in the (North) East? Interpreting the Rhetoric and Reality of Japanese Corporate
Governance, PAC. ECON. PAPER 359, Austl.-Japan Research Center (2006), available at
http://www.crawford.anu.edu.au/pdf/pep/pep-359.pdf; see also Leon Wolff, Corporate
Governance and Law Reform in Japan: From the Lost Decade to the End of History?, in
JAPANESE MANAGEMENT: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW BALANCE BETWEEN CONTINUITY AND CHANGE
133-166 (Rene Haak & Markus Pudelko eds., 2005). Apparently, this trait still persists and
131
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Under these circumstances, the wisdom of adopting perspectives and
practices favored by or familiar to one party can be easily challenged. The
latter part of the statement seems to ignore the need for countries seeking
foreign investment to provide incentives to induce foreign investment to an
area where domestic investment is hard to attract.132 Those incentives are
not unfair in nature and to regulate this would not be consistent with the
goals of the FTA to promote trade and investment. Nonetheless, the FTA
stipulates that there should be no favorable treatment of foreign
investors.133
In the U.S.-Korea FTA, the United States and Korea have agreed to
accord national treatment and MFN treatment to foreign investors. 134
Negotiations continued on the dispute settlement procedure for investorstate disputes (ISDs) as well as the adoption of temporary safeguards
against cross-border capital transactions and remittances in national
financial emergencies.135 In relation to the former, concern was raised that
the dispute settlement procedure, which allows foreign investors to file
complaints against the government of the other party outside the domestic
court system of the latter, may undermine the state’s ability to establish and
undertake legitimate public policies that may have a bearing on foreign
investment. 136 The two countries agreed on the dispute settlement
affects economic regulation in countries affected by this culture. These differing notions
regarding the role of government in the context of different cultures were also discussed in
one of the WTO disputes between the United States and Japan. See Panel Report, Japan —
Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, WT/DS44/R (Apr. 22, 1998),
at 10.43–10.46 [hereinafter Japan Film], available at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds44_e.htm. Under these circumstances, one could argue
that an attempt to apply laws and regulations of one country to another always requires
careful scrutiny and forethought.
132
By way of example, in 2002 the state of Alabama provided a US$252.8 million package
to attract Hyundai Automobiles to establish a manufacturing plant in the state as an effort to
stimulate its sagging economic vitality. See Michael Tomberlin & Kristi L. Ellis, Hyundai
Incentives: $252.8 million, State Officials Say Automaker’s $1 Billion Investment Worth It,
BIRMINGHAM NEWS, April 5, 2002, at 1A & 2A. In other words, even the local governments
of the United States offer preferential treatment to foreign investors to have them invest in
their own regions.
133
KORUS FTA, supra note 1, art.11.4, para. 2.
134
Id. arts. 11.3 & 11.4.
135
Press Release, MOFAT, Han-Mi FTA Je 4 Cha Gongsig Hyeobsang Gyeolgwa [Major
Results of the Fourth Round of Official Korea-U.S. FTA Negotiations] (Oct. 27, 2006)
[hereinafter MOFAT, Fourth Round Results], http://www.fta.go.kr/new/ftakorea/broadpsd.
asp?country_idx=19 (use arrows to search archive for press release no. 62, dated Oct. 27,
2006).
136
Joo-Hee Roh, Government Adopts the Settlement Procedure for Investor-State Disputes
as Inevitable, PRESSIAN NEWS, Nov. 22 2006 (in Korean). Some experts opined that foreign
investors would not be able to undermine public policies by filing complaints under the
proposed dispute settlement procedure. See Press Release, MOFAT, Han-Mi FTA Je 3 Cha
Hyeobsang Gwanlyeon Jeonglye Beuliping [Korea-U.S. FTA Negotiations Third Briefing]
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procedure with certain exemptions.137 Korea – having a vivid memory of
the catastrophic 1997 financial crisis – demanded a temporary safeguard be
in place which would enable the government to stop the outflow of foreign
currency reserves should this type of financial crisis recur.138 The United
States and Korea have agreed to this safeguard provided that there is a oneyear durational limit and that certain guidelines are met.139 Both parties
have also agreed to prevent retrospective application of law and to allow a
provisional remedy to aggrieved investors.140
F. Regulatory Issues
The United States has long held the opinion that much of the
difficulty that U.S. exporters face abroad has been caused by lack of
transparency in the application of relevant laws and regulations of the
importing countries, and thus has consistently contended that these
regulatory problems undermine the interests of U.S. businesses abroad.
Moreover, the United States pointed to the existence of collusion between
the Korean government and private corporations, and questioned the
procedural transparency of trade and investment laws.141 Consequently, the
United States raised regulatory and institutional issues during negotiations
and applied pressure on Korea to improve the transparency and
predictability of its legal procedures. As a result, every chapter of the FTA
includes a separate transparency provision requiring publications and
notices prior to the implementation of relevant laws. There is also a
separate provision dedicated to the manner and timing of the publication of
any laws or regulations that will affect the rights of the other country under
the FTA.142
In addressing regulatory issues, however, reciprocity seems to have
been missing. The USTR affirmed that U.S. laws and regulations would

(Sept. 5, 2006), http://www.fta.go.kr/new/ftakorea/broadpsd.asp?country_idx=19 (use
arrows to search archive for press release no. 55, dated Sept. 5, 2006).
137
KORUS FTA, supra note 1, art 11, sec. B.
138
For the causes and developments of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, see generally
Andrew Berg, The Asia Crisis: Causes, Policy Responses and Outcomes (Int’l Monetary
Fund, Working Paper No. WP/99/138, 1999),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/1999/wp99138.pdf (noting the
significant role of sudden capital outflows as a source of fundamental vulnerability during
the Asian financial crisis in 1997); see also HAIDER A. KHAN, GLOBAL MARKETS AND
FINANCIAL CRISES IN ASIA (2004) (explaining the financial crisis as the result of
liberalization, weak domestic institutions for economic governance and a chaotic global
market system without global governance institutions).
139
KORUS FTA, supra note 1, annex 11-G.
140
Id. arts. 11.15–11.22. See also MOFAT, Fourth Round Results, supra note 135.
141
Portman, Letter, supra note 87.
142
KORUS FTA, supra note 1, art. 21.1
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not change as a result of the U.S. - Korea FTA, but that the United States
would raise regulatory issues with Korea and seek changes accordingly.143
It should also be noted that the significant differences in legal traditions
and business practices may cause foreign businesses to conclude, often
inaccurately, that they have been subjected to unfair and unjust
treatment.144 For instance, the United States emphasizes and promotes
individual competition. By way of contrast, Korean culture places
importance on the traditional cooperative relationship between the
government and businesses,145 even though government interventions have
been reduced in recent decades.
This difference stems from the dissimilar perspectives on the role
of government and the way in which government and private businesses
should interact.146 Thus, it may be inappropriate to measure the perceived
government-private cooperation relationship in Korea against U.S. customs
and practices, or to discuss ways of dissolving such a relationship under the
FTA with a presumption that it is a form of illegal collusion that results in
unfair competition and lack of transparency.147 It will be more efficient to
address specific instances of unfair treatment affecting trade and
investment through mutually-agreed communication channels, such as
consultations, rather than trying to force one country to conform its laws
and customs to the standards of the other. A renowned Australian scholar
has also commented on this U.S. tendency to have a FTA negotiating
partner comply with its own practices and expectations, by stating, with
reference to the U.S.-Australia FTA, that “while Australia wanted
conventional FTAs with reduction of trade barriers, the United States
seems to have wanted its own version of an FTA to be imposed on
Australia with new regulatory attachments such as higher IPR
standards.”148

143

Portman, Letter, supra note 87.
See generally Japan Film, supra note 131, for the argument on the part of the United
States, in noting that Japan’s new legal regime has been affected by the influx of AngloAmerican jurisprudence, and the further point that any attempt to apply laws and regulations
of one country to another always requires careful consideration of social and cultural
differences.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Professor Ross Buckley of the University of New South Wales referred to the Australian
stance as the 19th century free trade agreement and the American attitude as the (American)
21st century free trade one. Research Seminar with Professor Ross Buckley, in The
University of New South Wales, Sydney (Feb. 19, 2009); see also CHALLENGES TO
MULTILATERAL TRADE: THE IMPACT OF BILATERAL, PREFERENTIAL AND REGIONAL
AGREEMENTS (Ross Buckley et al, eds., Kluwer Law Int’l 2008) (noting that WTO
multilateral negotiations to liberalize trade have become increasingly difficult, as newer
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With respect to the competition issue, specification that the
antitrust laws be applied to the Korean conglomerates (chaebol) became a
point of debate.149 The United States questioned whether competition laws
are being applied strictly to those chaebol corporations and wanted the FTA
to specify the responsibility of the Korean government to apply
competition laws to them. The Korean government disagreed and argued
that since antitrust laws of Korea are already being applied to chaebol
corporations, explicit specification in the FTA would be inappropriate.
Here again, the demand by the United States for such specification in the
FTA shows its consistent emphasis on the regulatory issues which is
arguably beyond the purview of trade agreements. Perhaps both parties
could have considered replacing rampant applications of trade remedy
measures, such as antidumping measures, with more comprehensive
regulations against anticompetitive behavior, but it was not discussed in the
course of the FTA negotiations.150
Lastly, there are a couple of regulatory issues between the United
States and Korea that are worth mentioning, namely the Korean taxation
scheme on automobiles, and the drug price review system. In relation to
automobiles, the United States has been complaining about Korea’s
taxation scheme, which imposes higher tax rates on automobiles with larger
engine displacement. Because U.S.-made automobiles tend to have
engines larger in size than those of their competitors, they have been
subjected to higher tax rates. In the FTA, Korea has agreed to amend its
Special Consumption Tax Law and the Annual Vehicle Tax Law to reduce
the tax rates applicable to automobiles with larger engine displacement.151
Within 3 years of the date of coming into force of this Agreement, vehicles
with engines larger than 1000 ccs are to be taxed at a single rate of no more
than 5%.152 Korea has also agreed not to amend or otherwise modify the
Subway Bond and Regional Development Bond so as to increase the
disparity in purchase rates across categories of vehicles at the time the
Agreement comes into force.153 Higher tax rates applicable to cars with
larger engine displacement have been justified in Korea due to its policy of
discouraging use of automobiles that consume more gas and overload

members are generally developing countries with interests and attitudes different from those
of industrialized countries).
149
Press Release, MOFAT, What Are Trade Remedies, Intellectual Property Rights, and
Positive Lists? (Nov. 8, 2006).
150
The Canada-Chile FTA abolished antidumping duties after 2003, and competition laws
would control dumping disputes between the two countries.
151
KORUS FTA, supra note 1, art 2.12(a) & (b) (providing that vehicles with engines under
1000 ccs will not be taxed; engines larger than 1001–2000 ccs will not be taxed more than
5%; and engines larger than 2000 ccs will not be taxed more than 8%).
152
Id. art. 2.12(a)(ii).
153
Id. art. 2.12(c).
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smaller Korean roads with heavier weights. Hence, the demand by the
United States for this regulatory change is another example where one
country’s regulatory scheme for legitimate public policy objectives had to
be abandoned to satisfy the interests of its trade partner.
The United States also opposed Korea’s drug price review system,
under which the appropriateness of a drug price is reviewed before it can be
covered by the publicly-funded Korean health insurance program. The
United States has been concerned that U.S. drugs, which tend to be more
expensive, may not be covered by the Korean health insurance program.
Nonetheless, Korea has maintained that it would not abandon the price
review system, which it considers necessary to sustain the publicly-funded
health insurance system in sound fiscal condition, but has agreed to
establish a committee to consider views of U.S. pharmaceutical companies.
154
In the final draft, Korea has agreed to ensure that the procedures, rules,
and guidelines that apply to reimbursements are fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory, and that reimbursements would be made at competitive
market-derived prices.155
Concern has been raised that by allowing competitive marketderived prices to be the measure of reimbursements, the price review
system will not be able to achieve its objective of keeping reimbursements
at an economically feasible level and of maintaining the sound fiscal
condition of the publicly funded Korean healthcare system.156 Furthermore,
under the effects of a footnote in Article 5.2 of the FTA – which stipulates
that pharmaceutical formulary development and management will be
governed by the rules on government procurement – only technical
examinations, but not economic review, will be allowed during selection of
drugs. Consequently, the government agency will not be able to exclude
expensive foreign drugs on the basis of their prices so long as those drugs
are approved for safety and effectiveness.157 An estimate has been made
that because of this concession, the financial burden on the Korean
healthcare system will increase by over US$2 billion a year to cover the
increased reimbursement costs.158

154

MOFAT, Seventh Round Results, supra note 111.
KORUS FTA, supra note 1, art. 5.2 (a) & (b).
156
Gungangbohumeun Jikyutdaduni: Hyupjungmoon Bunsukhalsoorok Gagwan [You Said
that You Would Regulate the Price of Medication: the More You Analyze the Agreement, the
More Nonsensical It Is], PRESSIAN NEWS, May 27, 2007, http://www.pressian.com/article/
article.asp?article_num=30070527151529&Section=.
157
Id.
158
Interview by Si-Yeon Kim and Ho-Joong Kim with Suk-Kyun Woo, Policy Director,
Alliance of Korean Healthcare Assn’s (Mar. 29, 2007) (in Korean).
155
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G. Restrictions on Trade Remedy Measures
Trade remedy measures, such as antidumping (AD) measures,
countervailing duties (CVDs), and exclusionary orders against alleged
unfair trade practices, should also be examined in relation to regulatory
issues. When abused, these trade measures do not promote free trade, and
particularly in the case of AD measures, there is little question that these
measures have operated as discriminatory and arbitrary import regulations
against inexpensive exports. 159 Abusive trade remedy measures are
contrary to the very objective of the FTA of promoting free trade, and an
effective mechanism should be in order to deal with them.160 In relation to
trade remedy measures, extraterritorial application of domestic antitrust
laws against businesses of trading partner nations, and enforcement of
criminal charges on their citizens for business activities taken place outside
U.S. territory, run counter to the internationally recognized “Principle of
Territoriality” that domestic laws apply within the boundaries of the nation
making such laws. This practice is also inconsistent with the aim of the
FTA to establish a business and economic environment favorable to free
trade.161
159

Yong-Shik Lee, Toward a More Open Trading System: Should Safeguards Replace
Antidumping Measures?, 1 21ST CENTURY L. REV. 2, 3-14 (2005). A Yale economist, T. N.
Srinivasan “characterized antidumping as the equivalent of a nuclear weapon in the armoury
of trade policy and suggested removing [such practices]” altogether. Int’l Inst. for
Sustainable Dev., Report on the WTO’s High-Level Symposium on Trade and Development
(Mar. 17–18, 1999) (summary record of remarks by delegates at WTO Symposium on Trade
and Development), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/summhl_e.
htm.
160
In the Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA), for
instance, entered into by China and Hong Kong on June 29, 2003, there is a prohibition
against imposition of AD and CVD measures. Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic
Partnership Agreement, China-H.K., June 29, 2003 (entered into force Jan. 1, 2004), ch.1,
art. 7, available at http://www.tid.gov.hk/english/cepa/files/main_e.pdf. AD measures are
also not permitted in the Australia-New Zealand FTA. Agreement Establishing the
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area, Feb. 27, 2009 (entered into force Jan. 1,
2010), ch. 1, art. 3, sec. e(ii), available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/aanzfta/aanzfta.PDF.
161
Extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law has been internationally criticized, and
countries including Great Britain and Canada have enacted laws that prohibit their citizens
from cooperating with extraterritorial U.S. antitrust investigations. See, e.g., Protection of
Trading Interests Act, 1980, c. 11 (Eng.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/1980/11/contents; see also A. V. Lowe, Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The
British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 257 (1981). However,
though the Canadian approach has historically been to oppose extraterritoriality of U.S.
antitrust laws after the uranium controversies of the 1970s and 80s the prosecutorial
agencies of the two governments signed a series of high-level memorandums, ultimately
leading up to the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) of 1990. Konrad von
Finckenstein, Can. Comm’r of Competition, Address at a Joint Meeting in Vancouver of the
American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law and the Canadian Bar Association
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Korea, whose exports have been frequently targeted for AD and
CVD measures from various countries including the United States, 162
requested Washington to tighten its requirements for the application of
these measures in order to prevent abuse. However, the USTR has
expressed difficulty in doing so,163 reiterating that the U.S. law does not
give them the authority to make decisions that will change the existing
trade remedy laws, and the decision is one to be made by the U.S.
Congress.164 Instead, both governments have agreed to set up a Committee
on Trade Remedies where they would discuss trade remedy measures, 165
but no real change in the application of trade remedy measures is expected
as a result of the negotiations since it requires legislative adjustments on
the part of the United States which it has consistently refused.
V.

IMPLEMENTATION AND PROSPECTS OF THE U.S. -KOREA FTA
A. Subsequent Legislation in Korea after Conclusion of the US Korea FTA

Even before the ratification of the US-Korea FTA by the Korean
National Assembly, a series of legislations and bills have been introduced
by the Korean government in order to ensure conformity with the
agreement: it was expected that as many as 25 statutes, including tax and
customs laws, foreign trade laws, intellectual property laws and the laws
regulating service industries, would have to be either newly enacted or
amended to ensure conformity with the FTA.166 The following discusses
examples of two areas of law, namely the law regarding legal service
market and intellectual property law.
In response to the upcoming opening of the Korean legal service
market in accordance with the provisions of the FTA,167 the Foreign Legal

National Competition Law Section: International Antitrust Cooperation: Bilateralism or
Multilateralism? (May 31, 2001), available at http://www.apeccp.org.tw/doc/Canada/
Policy/1a.htm.
162
See KTC, STATISTICS, supra note 84.
163
MOFAT, First Round, supra note 103.
164
Suk-Hwan Choi, FTA Hyupsangdan, Muyeogguje Yogu Sahang Daepog Chugso
[Delegation for FTA Negotiations, Significantly Reduces Demands for Trade Remedies],
PRESSIAN NEWS, Dec. 6, 2006 http://www.pressian.com/article/article.asp?article_num
=30061206131812&Section=.
165
KORUS FTA, supra note 1, sec. C.
166
Beobjecheo ‘Han-Mi FTA Jeongbipilyo Beoblyeong 70geon’ [Ministry of Legislation:
‘70 Laws Require Amendment under the KORUS FTA’], CHOSUN ILBO (June 7, 2007),
http://issue.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2007/06/11/2007061100910.html. In addition, it
is expected that 25 Presidential Decrees and 18 Ministerial Ordinances will be amended to
conform with the FTA. Id.
167
KORUS FTA, supra note 1, ch. 12.
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Consultant Act (“FLCA”) was enacted on March 2, 2009 and took effect as
of September 26, 2009. The FLCA permits a foreign lawyer who is
licensed in FTA signatory countries to register with the Korean Bar
Association as a "foreign legal consultant (‘FLC’)" for limited law practice
in Korea and a foreign law firm to open an office in Korea.
The liberalization of the Korean legal service market under the
FLCA takes three steps. At the first stage, the FLC is permitted to offer
consultation of law of the country where the FLC is licensed; consultation
of treaties to which the country joined or of generally recognized
international law; and representation in international arbitration to which
the applicable law is foreign law or public international law. At the second
stage, which is set to start within two years after the FTA comes into force,
a foreign law firm will be allowed to form an affiliate relationship with a
Korean law firm and is permitted to take cases with a Korean law firm in
which both the U.S. and Korean laws are involved. At the final phase,
which is scheduled to start within five years after the FTA becomes
effective, a foreign law firm will be permitted to form a partnership with a
Korean law firm and hire Korean lawyers under certain conditions.
As to the intellectual property law area, amendments to the
Copyright Act were made to reflect the terms of the U.S.-Korea FTA.168
The following changes were made: (1) neighboring rights are fully
protected in accordance with the international treaties; (2) certain online
service providers (“OSPs”) shall take necessary measures that cut off
illegal forwarding of the relevant works if requested by the holder of rights;
(3) the Korean government, including local governments, may adopt
administrative measures to prevent copyright infringement, such as
collection, deletion, or destruction of copies and tools which infringe
copyright, and suspension of infringing bulletin board service after three
warnings (so called “Three Strike-out System”); (4) copyright infringers
may be indicted in the absence of the complaint filed by the copyright
owner, if such infringements were committed commercially and habitually.
Also, by amendment to the Customs Act, the border measures extends to
copyright infringement where a copyright owner can record its works with
the customs office and take actions if suspected infringing goods pass
through customs.
In addition, the Korean government proposed other IPR-related
bills to the National Assembly, to comply with the FTA provisions.169 The
168

Jeojakgwon beob [Copyright Act], Act. No. 432 (1957), amended and substantially
revised by Law No. 3916, Dec. 31, 1986, and Law No. 8101, Dec. 28, 2006 (entered into
force June 29, 2007), amended by Law No. 9529, Mar. 25, 2009 (entered into force Sept. 26,
2009), amended by Law No. 9625, Apr. 22, 2009 (entered into force July 23, 2009) (S.
Kor.), available at http://eng.copyright.or.kr/law_01_01.html.
169
DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] [CONSTITUTION] art. 52 (S. Kor.), available at
http://english.ccourt.go.kr/home/att_file/download/Constitution_of_the_Republic_of_Korea.
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bills included further amendments to the Copyright Act,170 the Patent Act171
and the Trademark Act.172 These developments and efforts on the part of
the Korean government demonstrated the strong will of the Korean
government to implement the U.S.-Korea FTA immediately after its
ratification by the legislature. The Korean government also prepared
revisions of administrative regulations for implementation of the FTA.
There has been no corresponding effort on the part of the U.S. Congress to
enact or amend any of the U.S. legislations.
B. Additional Negotiation of the FTA between the United States
and Korea
Beginning from early 2010, the United States and Korea sought to
find a breakthrough for the pending U.S.-Korea FTA. The breakthrough
came in June 2010 at the G-20 meeting in Toronto, when the presidents of
the two countries agreed to make concerted efforts to finalize the
agreement by the following G-20 meeting in Seoul in November 2010.173
Accordingly, President Obama directed USTR Ron Kirk to work with his
Korean counterpart to resolve outstanding issues, namely the automobile
and beef issues. 174 President Obama also indicated his willingness to
present the FTA for Senate ratification once the “additional negotiation”
was complete on November 11, 2010.
Despite the efforts of the two governments since the
announcement, including successive rounds of intensive negotiations right
before the deadline, the two sides failed to reach agreement. 175 In the joint
press conference in Seoul, the two presidents expressed their frustration but
promised to direct the officials of the two governments to continue the
negotiations to resolve the outstanding issues.176 This promise bore fruit

pdf (empowering both the Executive branch and the National Assembly to submit bills of
legislation).
170
Submitted on October 10, 2008, as Bill No.1801513, and currently pending before the
National Assembly.
171
Proposed on October 25, 2007, as Bill No. 177655, but not reviewed due to expiry of the
2008 parliamentary session.
172
Submitted on October 13, 2008, as Bill No. 1801518.
173
Office of the Press Secretary, the White House, Remarks by President Obama and
President Lee Myung-Bak of the Republic of Korea After Bilateral Meeting (June 26,
2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obamaand-president-lee-myung-bak-republic-korea-after-bilateral-.
174
See COOPER, PROVISIONS AND IMPLICATIONS, supra note 6, at 1.
175
Office of the Press Secretary, the White House, Press Conference by the President After
G20 Meetings in Seoul, Korea (Nov. 12, 2010),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/12/press-conferencepresident-after-g20-meetings-seoul-korea.
176
Id.
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when the representatives of the two countries finally completed additional
negotiation on December 3, 2010, with new agreements after four-days of
intensive talks.177 Those agreements include further concessions by Korea
on the automobile issue,178 which will help overcome the opposition to the
FTA by the U.S. automobile industry but have been criticized in Korea as
undermining Korea’s key trade interest to be gained by the FTA.179
C. Prospects for Ratification by the U.S. and Korean Legislatures
As cited above, there have been considerable political objections to
the U.S.-Korea FTA in both countries. Ultimately, however, the U.S.Korea FTA is expected to be ratified by both legislatures.180 Despite the
perceived imbalance of gains from the FTA and the social and economic
risks it creates, the Korean political leadership seems to be determined to
have the FTA with the United States, because of their conviction that this

177

Office of the Press Secretary, the White House, Statement by the President Announcing
the US-Korea Trade Agreement (Dec. 3, 2010),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/12/03/statement-presidentannouncing-us-korea-trade-agreement.
178
Office of the Press Secretary, the White House, Informational Press Release: Increasing
U.S. Auto Exports and Growing U.S. Jobs Through the U.S. Korea Agreement (Dec. 3,
2010),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/fact_sheet_increasing_us_auto_exports_us_ko
rea_free_trade_agreement.pdf.
179
Dae-Hee Lee, Migukcha Sooip Jangbyuk Munuhjyudta: ‘Obamaeyu Sunglee’ [Import
Barrier for American Cars has Collapsed: ‘Obama’s Victory’], PRESSIAN NEWS, Dec. 5,
2010, http://www.pressian.com/article/article.asp?article_num=30101205132112&section
=02. According to the new agreement, the removal of U.S. tariffs against import of
automobiles from Korea, which has been hailed by the Korean government as a major
achievement, will be suspended for five years for passenger cars and for ten years for trucks.
This will be a loss to Korea which exports significantly more automobiles to the U.S. than
the U.S. does to Korea. Korea has also agreed to relax application of new environmental
and gas mileage requirements in favor of U.S. automobile exports. At the request of the
U.S., Korea has further agreed to a safeguard provision whereby a party of the FTA may
adopt tariffs against imported automobiles if imports surge after the removal of tariffs. In
return for these concessions, Korea reportedly received concessions on agriculture and
pharmaceutical imports, but one criticism was that the extent of U.S. concessions was not
comparable to that of Korea on the automobile issue. Reflecting on this imbalance, a senior
Korean politician commented that additional negotiation was bound to be completed in the
U.S.’s favor, since it was held shortly after the Yeon-Pyeong incident, when North Korea
shelled the South Korean island causing civilian casualties, and South Korea asked for U.S.
diplomatic and military assistance to preserve its security against the North. Kim JongHoon: ‘‘Hyupsang Jalmothaetda’ go mulruhnamyun haebyeongdae jiwon" [Kim JongHoon: ‘If I Am Fired Because ‘the Negotiations Fail,’ I Will Join the Marines’], CHOSUN
ILBO, Dec. 5, 2010, http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/12/05/2010120500573.
html?Dep1=news&Dep2=top&Dep3=top.
180
LEE, BETTER ALTERNATIVE, supra note 9, at 1.
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FTA will “upgrade” the Korean economy by providing it with a new
momentum for further economic growth; and that the FTA will also help
strengthen the security alliance with the United States.181
A renowned economist, Professor Jagdish Bhagwati, has
commented that Korea will (eventually) sign anything that the United
States asks, due to its security concerns.182 This is likely to be true, at least
for the FTA, in the end. With the U.S army playing an important role in
maintaining Korea’s national security, a certain extent of imbalance may
not be sufficient to justify backing away from the most important trade deal
with the United States. For the United States, some of the objections to the
FTA have already lost ground since Korea began to import American beef,
albeit, with some restrictions, and the political leadership will eventually
see how the U.S.-Korea FTA negotiations have met most of its key trade
interests with Korea. With China rapidly growing as an economic rival,
both U.S. Congress and the Democratic administration will also see the
vital importance of this “economic alliance” with Korea through the FTA.
VI.

FUTURE IMPACTS OF THE U.S. -KOREA FTA
A. Economic Integration between the United States and Korea

The U.S.-Korea FTA negotiations have achieved an extraordinary
result with respect to removing traditional trade barrier tariffs – there will
be no tariffs for trade of all industrial goods183 and complete market access
will be granted to all agricultural products except rice. The United States
has also attained a triumphant result, the magnitude of which is yet to be
realized by some of the political leaders: the FTA met almost all of U.S.
key trade objectives vis-à-vis Korea, such as market access for its
agricultural products and services industries, as well as securing
fundamental regulatory changes in Korea that will pave the way for
increasing exports of key U.S. products — such as pharmaceuticals — and
enhancing protection of its IPR interests to a level the USTR describes
“state of the art.”

181

The resolve of the Korean leadership to ratify the FTA was perhaps well demonstrated
when Representative Park Jin, Chairman of the National Assembly Foreign Affairs, Trade
and Unification Sub-Committee, having faced strong opposition from the opposing party,
excluded opposing Committee members from the meeting room and tabled the ratification
of the U.S.-Korea FTA without going through the normal process. Hyun-Kyung Kang,
Assembly in FTA Conflict, supra note 4.
182
Jagdish Bhagwati, Keynote Address at the American Society of International Law
(ASIL) Conference at the University of Minnesota Law School: Developing Countries in the
GATT Legal System, (May 24, 2007).
183
Press Release, MOFAT, Final Negotiation Results, supra note 82.
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From the outset of the U.S.-Korea FTA negotiations, the USTR
indicated that its objectives were not limited to the removal of trade
barriers, but included seeking changes in Korea’s regulatory systems and
practices as necessary to create an optimal business environment for U.S.
export industries. 184 The U.S. stance is in line with the previous
comprehensive FTAs that it has pursued with other countries. This intent
has also been revealed in the U.S.-Korea FTA negotiations by the U.S.’s
demands, inter alia, for legal changes in Korea’s IPR protection, creation
of a investment dispute settlement process that will sometimes replace
domestic court proceedings, changes in Korea’s domestic tax scheme on
automobiles, adjustment of the drug price review system, and specific ways
in which notice of pending legislation is to be given and specific laws are
to be applied.185 Many of the U.S. demands go well beyond trade issues
and have the effect of setting parameters for a broader range of Korean
domestic policies. This raises the question of whether the proposed U.S.Korea FTA is an attempt to integrate the economies of the United States
and of Korea, in the sense that the systems and practices of the latter will
be aligned in accordance with those of the former, even if systems of
economic governance are maintained separate between the two countries.
This “economic integration” seems to have support not only from
U.S. business communities, but also from some of the Korean population,
including high-level officials who believe that the “advanced” U.S.
standards are the global standards, and should therefore be adopted for the
benefit of Korea. They contend that the adoption of these standards through
the FTA will improve the competitiveness and efficiency of the Korean
economy.186 Nonetheless, identifying the systems and practices of a nation
that has different economic, social, and cultural priorities as simply being
more advanced, and attempting to adopt them without due reference to
those differences, would lead to problems. For instance, the more
“advanced” U.S. economic systems and practices have been criticized for
placing too much emphasis on competition and short-term profits, as
dramatically shown in the recent debacles of the financial crisis in 2008,
and too little on other important values, such as provision of the public
good and protection of the economically underprivileged. The neglect of
these values has caused extreme wealth gaps among its population and led

184

Portman, Letter, supra note 87.
It has been estimated that as much as 15% of Korean laws will have to be amended after
the U.S.-Korea FTA, while the United States is prepared to amend none. See Joo-Hee Roh,
Han-Mi FTA Chaegyul Dwaemyun Bubryul 15% Ttuduh Gochuhya, [After the U.S.-Korea
FTA, 15% of Laws Will Have to be Amended], PRESSIAN NEWS, Jan. 16, 2007,
http://www.pressian.com/article/article.asp?article_num=30070116164222&Section=.
186
Hyun-Chong Kim, Significance of the Korea-U.S. FTA from Korea’s Perspective, supra
note 20.
185
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to the inadequacy of its social welfare system.187 An economic culture
emphasizing consumption is an important cause of the astronomical budget
and trade deficits in the United States. 188 It has been suggested that
implanting U.S. economic systems and practices in Korea may pose the
danger of dismantling Korean public policy and social stability.189
A careful analysis should be conducted to see whether the expected
gains from the proposed FTA are balanced between the United States and
Korea. While the United States is expected to increase its exports
significantly in agriculture, pharmaceuticals, and services,190 the increase in
Korean exports may not be comparable because U.S. tariff rates are already
low on major Korean exports, including automobiles, semiconductors, and
ships. Furthermore, major Korean export industries, such as automobiles,
have already been increasing production within the United States.191 Also,
Korea has been unsuccessful in getting the United States to agree to tighten
its requirements for the application of AD and CVD measures against
Korean products, which would have provided tangible benefits to the
Korean exports.192 Korea has also been unable to persuade the United
States to agree to change its rules of origin for textile products based on
yarn-forwarding,193 save a few exceptions. Additionally, Korea has not
been able to increase the number of job-based visa issuances for Korean

187

For example, the United States does not have universal healthcare coverage and due to
the high premiums of private insurance companies, more than 50 million Americans are
without any health insurance coverage. See CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES:
2009 22 (2010), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/p60-238.pdf. These
people are unlikely to have other financial sources for adequate medical care — though the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) of 2010 is expected to reduce the
number of uninsured. In contrast, Korea has enjoyed a publicly-funded, universal health
care system since the 1970s, under which virtually every citizen is entitled to health care,
indicative of a clearly differing social consensus in each country as to the public provision
of health care to the economically disadvantaged.
188
The U.S. budget deficit reached US$455 billion and trade deficit US$673 billion in 2008.
U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, The Federal Government’s Financial Health: A Citizen’s
Guide to the 2008 Financial Report of the United States Government (Feb. 13, 2009),
available at http://www.gao.gov/financial/citizensguide2008.pdf (referring to U.S. budget
deficit in 2008); see also Mild Increase in U.S. Trade Deficit a Good Thing, FINANCIAL
POST, May 12, 2009, http://www.financialpost.com/story.html?id=1588142 (referring to U.S.
trade deficit in 2008).
189
Yong-Shik Lee, Issues and Outlook, supra note 29, at 226.
190
USITC, Impact, supra note 15, at 5-19–5-21.
191
Hae-Yeong Lee, Worst International Fraud, see supra note 83.
192
KTC, STATISTICS, supra note 84.
193
The 2001 USITC report indicates that the textiles industry is among the product areas in
which Korea may expect the largest increases in exports under the FTA. USITC, Impact,
supra note 15, at 5-11 (indicating that the textile industry is among the product areas in
which Korea may expect the largest increase in exports under the U.S.-Korea FTA).
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service providers, which could have secured a constant flow of Korean
exports on the service front.194 Dubious outcomes in these areas of core
interest to Korea, coupled with the granting of major concessions in
agriculture and services to the U.S., are expected to cause large job losses
and may also sacrifice Korea’s growth potential in these areas. This
possibility has brewed widespread skepticism as to the nature of the
prospective benefit for Korea, though some studies taking a broader view
of the FTA suggest it will have mixed costs and benefits for both sides.195
The social and economic impact of the elaborate IPR provisions and the
provisions affecting the operation of the drug price review system will also
be significant.196
In addition to the substantive problems posed by the proposed
U.S.-Korea FTA, procedural issues have been raised with respect to the
negotiation process. It has been pointed out that the U.S.-Korea FTA
negotiations could have started with more preparation, particularly on the
part of Korea,197 and that the Korean government could have exerted efforts
to consult interest groups which might be affected by the proposed FTA.
Furthermore, the parties proceeded in haste in an attempt to complete all
negotiations before the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) of the U.S.
President expired in the summer of 2007. 198 Consequently, fierce
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According to the 2001 USITC report, Korea’s service exports are expected to decrease by
over 5% under the U.S.-Korea FTA. Id. at 5-12.
195
But see Schott, Negotiating, supra note 89 (explaining how the U.S.-Korea FTA would
result in some shifts in employment in Korea, but also arguing that Korea as a whole would
benefit from the FTA and that there would be a change in the allocation rather than degree
of employment).
196
See supra notes 154 to 158 and accompanying text. A proponent of the U.S.-Korea FTA
described the FTA as “the economic highway” for Korea. Cho Tae-Yul, Deputy Minister
for Trade, Statement at the 2007 World Knowledge Forum in Seoul: Regional Integration
and the Next Step of KORUS FTA (Oct. 17, 2007), http://young.mofat.go.kr/webmodule/
common/download.jsp?boardid=753&tablename=TYPE_SPEECH&seqno=fcbfe3fd8fe0fe3
fa106b01e&fileseq=fcffbf06ef9402fff0fb106b. This “highway” seems to be only one-way,
since the United States made relatively few concessions in comparison to the large ones
made by Korea in areas of key American interest, such as agriculture, pharmaceuticals,
IPRs, and services.
197
USITC conducted research on the economic effects of the U.S.-Korea FTA at the request
of the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, and produced a CRP report in 2001 (see USITC,
Impact, supra note 15), but according to a former adviser to the Korean President the
Korean government did not engage in extensive research prior to the beginning of the FTA
negotiations. By way of contrast, it completed five years of research prior to the beginning
of the Korea-Japan FTA negotiations, even though its effects were expected to be more
limited than that of the U.S.-Korea FTA. Joo-Myung Lee, Former Adviser to the President,
Tae In Chung, Criticizes the U.S.-Korea FTA, PRESSIAN NEWS, Mar. 28, 2006.
198
See Lee, Challenges, supra note 59, for a discussion of the widespread dissatisfaction
over the Korean government’s handling of the U.S.-Korea FTA negotiations; see also Korea
Sees Worst Labor Protests in Years, CHOSUN ILBO, supra note 30.
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objections to the U.S.-Korea FTA negotiations have sharply divided
Korean society, causing hundreds of thousands of citizens to rally in the
streets of Korea.199 The problem has been compounded by an assertion that
an estimate of the positive effect of the proposed U.S.-Korea FTA on the
Korean economy, conducted by KIEP, a government-funded research
institute, and cited extensively by the government to support the U.S.Korea FTA, may have been exaggerated. 200 Furthermore, democratic
deficiency was clearly a problem during the FTA negotiations on the part
of Korea. Although any treaty negotiation inevitably involves a certain
level of confidentiality and requires the executive branch to make prompt
decisions on its own, proper consultation with various interest groups and
the timely provision of sufficient information to domestic constituents
could have elicited more support from the public.201
The benefits that the FTA would create for the economy as a whole
might not be very significant for either the United States or Korea. USITC
estimated that the impact of the U.S.-Korea FTA on economic growth
would be very small: GDP increases of 0.2% for United States and 0.7%
for Korea.202 As discussed above, several industries in the United States —
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Korea Sees Worst Labor Protests in Years, CHOSUN ILBO, supra note 30. The Korean
government, government-funded institutes, and big businesses in general are known to
support the U.S.-Korea FTA, whereas progressive NGOs, labor unions, farmers, and a near
majority of the general public oppose it. The preference of groups like the former in favor
of the FTA is reflected in a poll commissioned by the Korea Economic Institute (KEI) in
Washington D.C., in which 50 corporate representatives, experts, and government officials
expressed a rate of 90% in support of the proposed U.S.-Korea FTA. William Watts, The
Korea-US Free Trade Agreement: KORUS FTA Views of Experts and Concerned Parties:
Opinion Survey Report #1 (May 15, 2006) (survey report prepared for KEI President
Charles Pritchard), available at http://www.keia.org/Publications/Other/FTASurvey1.pdf.
200
Joo-Hee Roh, KIEP, Han-Mi FTA Gyeongjae Hyogwa Jaegumjeung ‘Mothagaetda’
[KIEP Refuses to Verify Economic Effect of the U.S.-Korea FTA], PRESSIAN NEWS, Apr. 20,
2006, www.pressian.com/scripts/section/article.asp?article_num=30060420114228.
201
On September 7, 2006, twenty-three members of the Korean National Assembly (Korean
legislature) filed a complaint with the Constitutional Court of Korea that the Korean
administration usurped the powers of the Korean National Assembly in its FTA
negotiations. Lawmakers Launch Lawsuit Against South Korea FTA Talks (Yonhap News
Agency, Seoul, S. Kor.), Sept. 7, 2006, available at http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?
article5789. Eventually, however, the Constitutional Court ruled in favor of the
administration and dismissed the complaint. Park Si-Soo, Constitutional Court Nods
Disputed Korea-US Bill, KOR. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2010, available at http://www.bilaterals.org/
spip.php?article18781. One of the authors of this article pointed out that the Korean
administration should be required to report the progress of the FTA negotiation to the
Korean National Assembly, so that the Korean legislature could oversee its progress on
behalf of the people. Yong-Shik Lee, Issues and Outlook, supra note 29, at 228. The U.S.
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USITC, Impact, supra note 15, at 5-2.
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including agriculture, service industries, and pharmaceuticals — stand to
gain significantly by substantially increasing their exports to Korea.203 It is,
however, doubtful that Korea will attain reciprocal trade gains after the
FTA when it has failed to secure its key trade interests, such as abolition or
reduction of trade remedy measures, and when trade barriers, if any, to its
major exports to the United States have already been low. While Korea has
made commitments to make substantial regulatory changes to create a more
favorable business environment for U.S. businesses, the systems and
practices of the United States, such as admission of foreign labor, will not
likely be changed as a result of the FTA. It remains to be seen what the
final tally for Korea will be like in terms of trade benefits after agreeing to
regulatory changes that may put considerable strains on its economic and
social system.
B. Stimulus for More FTAs and East Asia Free Trade Area
Setting aside the question of the economic benefits, the conclusion
of the U.S.-Korea FTA will be marked as a successful achievement for the
recent bilateral arrangements that both countries have pursued. Not only
will it further encourage these two countries to continue forging ahead with
their bilateral efforts with the other countries, but other countries will also
respond more favorably to U.S. and Korea’s bilateral FTA initiatives due to
the economic importance of these two countries. As mentioned earlier,
Korea is now negotiating FTAs with other major trading countries: after the
completion of the U.S.-Korea FTA negotiations, Korea has concluded
FTAs with the European Union and India and good progress is being made
with respect to FTA negotiations with Canada, Australia, Peru, Colombia
and New Zealand. It may also begin FTA negotiations with China in the
near future. 204 The United States is also conducting negotiations with
several countries, although U.S. counterparts are smaller, and FTAs with
them seem to have more political, rather than economic, significance.205 At
any rate, the spreading of bilateral arrangements for FTAs may distract
major trading countries from the multilateral trade negotiations at the WTO,
and make the successful conclusion of the stalled Doha Round negotiations
more difficult. This may lead to a more fragmented trading system in the
long run in the form of a “spaghetti bowl.”

203

Id. at 5-10 (predicting that U.S. agricultural and manufacturing exports to Korea would
significantly increase, but predicting fewer gains for the U.S. services industry).
204
See supra notes 21–24 and accompanying text (discussing China and Korea’s economic
relationship and the potential for a Sino-Korean FTA).
205
Id.
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The U.S.-Korea FTA will have regional implications beyond the
United States and Korea,206 and may set a new direction for the first transPacific free trade framework between East Asia and North America.
Shortly after the completion of the U.S.-Korea FTA negotiations, both
China and Japan expressed a desire to sign an FTA with Korea, fearing for
their isolation in the region.
As mentioned earlier, feasibility studies on an FTA between Korea
and China have been completed, and FTA negotiations between Korea and
Japan have also begun, but have subsequently been suspended due to
disagreement over agricultural issues.207 Japanese businesses have urged
the Japanese government to resume the suspended FTA negotiations with
Korea and start negotiations with the United States.208 With its growing
influence, China is seeking a leading role in trade and economy in Asia,
and has been looking to form closer trade relations with other major
economies in Asia, including Korea, India, and Japan.
C. Path to Trans-Pacific Free Trade Area
The successful conclusion of the U.S.-Korea FTA will not only
create the third largest free trade area in the world, after the E.U. and
NAFTA, but may also mark the beginning of a new trans-Pacific free trade
area, which will be the largest free trade area yet to be formed.
The key to forming a larger free trade area that includes East Asia
and North America would likely be determined by the Japanese stance on
agriculture. If Japan decides to open its agricultural market to the extent
that Korea did in the U.S.-Korea FTA, both the United States and Korea
will be willing to negotiate an FTA with Japan.209 The governments of
both countries have opined that Japan’s protective stance on agriculture is
the major obstacle to FTA negotiations with it,210 and there appears to be no
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See Schott, Negotiating, supra note 89, at 13–14 (anticipating new and revived trade
negotiations between Korea and its regional neighbors as a result of the U.S.-Korea FTA);
see also Inbom Choi & Jeffrey J. Schott, Free Trade Between Korea and the United States?
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Joint Statement, KYODO NEWS, Apr. 13, 2007; Business Roundtable & Nippon
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other significant issues that will block an FTA. Thus, if Japan’s position on
agricultural issues changes, FTAs between Japan and these two countries
will become feasible. Separate bilateral FTAs among the three countries
can lead to a legal framework for a single free trade agreement among
them,211 similar to how the bilateral FTA between the United States and
Canada was later adapted to include Mexico to form NAFTA. Canada will
also be a likely candidate of a membership for this new free trade area
between East Asia and North America. Canada already has an FTA with
the United States and is currently conducting FTA negotiations with Korea.
Business communities in both Canada and Japan have favored an FTA
between the two countries as well.212
China, however, will be unlikely to participate in this free trade
area, at least in the near future, due to its political and economic differences
with the United States and Japan. Thus, for the United States, the
formation of this trans-Pacific free trade area will be an ideal trade and
economic platform on which it can keep China in check and continue to be
a leading trade and economic force in both North America and East Asia.
For Japan, the participation in this free trade area will strengthen its trade,
economic, and even political position in the region against rapidly growing
China. For Korea and Canada, this free trade area will help them to access
their traditional export markets in Japan and the United States, without
creating obstacles to the furtherance of their trade relations with China. It
is in fact very likely that Korea will have a bilateral FTA with China and at
the same time participate in this free trade area, as demonstrated by China’s
willingness to sign an FTA with Korea even after Korea’s conclusion of
FTA negotiations with the United States.213 Conclusion of FTAs with
major trading nations such as China, the United States, Japan, and
European Union could turn Korea into a “hub” of regional and bilateral
free trade relations.
If the trans-Pacific free trade area is feasible, then the next question
is the nature and characteristics of a legal framework for this free trade area.
The legal framework is expected to be framed largely in accordance with
the preferences of the United States as shown in the U.S.-Korea FTA as
well as in the other FTAs that the United States has promoted: i.e. strong
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IPR provisions, emphasis of legal transparency and public participation,
high-degree of market opening for both agriculture and services, imposition
of labor and environmental standards, separate dispute settlement processes
and committees to discuss relevant issues under the FTA. This is because
the United States will be the key player in forming this regional free trade
area and will be unlikely to depart from or substantially concede its strong
policy stance that it has shown in the bilateral and other regional contexts.
One way or another, Korea had to accommodate the U.S. priorities for most
parts of the FTA negotiations, and it is not expected to be any different for
Japan or Canada.
As discussed earlier, some of the provisions in the U.S.-driven
FTAs were intended to bring regulatory practices and the business
environment of the signatory country in conformity with those of the
United States in order to create an optimal business environment for U.S.
export industries. Thus, these provisions will have far-reaching economic,
political, and social impact, and the degree of required market opening and
regulatory intervention under the FTA can be characterized as one that
leads to an economic integration among the signatory countries. The
question is how much of this impact can be tolerated by the society that
may have rather different economic, political, and social priorities as
previously discussed. Concern has been raised that the adjustment cost for
Korea as a result of the U.S.-Korea FTA will be enormous, particularly in
the areas of agriculture, IPRs and health care.214 Thus, the post-FTA
occurrences in Korea will be a barometer of whether an even larger free
trade area between East Asia and North America will be successful and
beneficial to all of the participating countries.
D. Encouragement for East Asia - Europe Free Trade Area
Economic integration between East Asia and North America
through the formation of a free trade area may also encourage formation of
another free trade area between East Asia and Europe. As stated, Korea
has completed its FTA negotiations with the European Union and the
agreement is set to go into effect as of July 1, 2011. Just as the U.S.-Korea
FTA can be developed into a larger free trade area as shown above, other
countries in the region may be added to the free trade framework initially
formed between the European Union and Korea as well. Japan can also be
a participant in this agreement, again if it somehow decides to open its
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agricultural market. Japan’s bilateral FTA with the E.U.215 and Korea’s
bilateral FTA with the E.U. can be then merged into a single framework for
free trade, creating a free trade area between Europe and East Asia. This
means that East Asia can become a hub of free trade areas linked with both
Europe and North America. It will no doubt create significant impact and
new dynamics in world trade and economy, but the economic analysis to
measure this impact must yet await the realization of these pan-continental
free trade areas. In all of this, China is likely to be excluded. For Korea, it
also remains to be seen whether this “web” of FTAs would revitalize the
Korean economy with a new growth momentum as hoped by its
leadership.216 It indeed remains to be seen whether the FTA is a path to
common economic prosperity or simply a false promise.
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